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USAID Prioritizing Reform, Innovation, and Opportunities for Reaching Indonesia’s Teachers, Administrators, and Students (USAID PRIORITAS)

An Investigation into the Teacher Deployment and Teacher Continuing Professional Development Programs in Indonesia

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Acronyms

%T/%Temp	percentage temporary teachers
%US	percentage undersupply of teachers
BOS	Government allocated School Operational Assistance Funds
CJA	District A in Central Java
CJB	District B in Central Java
CJC	District C in Central Java
CLCC	Creating Learning Communities for Children (UNICEF-UNESCO)
CPD	continuing professional development
DA	District Assembly
DAPODIK	Data Pokok Pendidikan (Basic Education Data) [MOEC's national Web-based Education Management Information System (EMIS)]
DBE	Decentralizing Basic Education
DC	District of Columbia
DEH	District Education Head
DEO	District Education Office
DH	District Head
EGR	Early grade reading
GOI	Government of Indonesia
ICT	information and communication technology
JS	junior secondary
MBE	Managing Basic Education project
MOEC	Ministry of Education and Culture
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSF	Multi-stakeholder forum
NA	not applicable
NC	North Carolina
P/T	pupil-teacher ratio
PCJ	USAID PRIORITAS Central Java Office
PE	physical education
PEO	Provincial Education Office
PIW	Policy implementation workshops
PJK	USAID PRIORITAS Jakarta Office
PRIORITAS	Prioritizing Reform, Innovation, and Opportunities for Reaching Indonesia's Teachers, Administrators, and Students
PSS	USAID PRIORITAS South Sulawesi Office with SPs and Provincial Education Officers
QA	Quality Assurance
Rp	rupiah
RTI	RTI International, a registered trademark and a trade name of Research Triangle Institute
SD	primary school/education
SMP	junior secondary school/education
SP	USAID PRIORITAS Service Provider
SSA	District A in South Sulawesi
SSB	District B in South Sulawesi
SSC	District C in South Sulawesi

SSD	District D in South Sulawesi
TD	teacher deployment
TDP	Teacher Deployment Program
TOT	training of trainers/training of teachers
TPP	teacher professional allowance
TTI	teacher training institute
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNM	Universitas Negeri Makassar (State University of Makassar)
US	United States
US	undersupply
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

Indonesia has a large teacher deployment issue characterized by an undersupply of civil service teachers; an abundance of temporary teachers leading to an oversupply of teachers (evidenced by a national primary-level pupil-teacher ratio of 16 to 1); and a mal-distribution of civil service teachers among urban and rural schools, with an oversupply of such teachers in urban schools and an undersupply in rural schools. To help address this issue, USAID PRIORITAS worked with the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) to develop the teacher deployment program (TDP). The TDP engaged selected districts to analyze data to quantify and qualify their teacher deployment issue, to identify the means by which they could address their teacher deployment issue—merging schools, creating multi-grade schools, transferring teachers, recruiting teachers, and/or reassigning teachers—and to help them develop a detailed TDP plan that, when implemented, would address the teacher deployment issue. This study examines why some districts performed better than others in implementing their TDP plans.

USAID PRIORITAS has also worked closely with MOEC and a number of selected districts to improve the quality and quantity of teacher training. To help sustain this work, USAID PRIORITAS worked with MOEC to develop the Continuing Professional Development (CPD) program. The CPD program engaged a number of selected districts to analyze data about teacher needs; to select teacher training programs that could address those needs, with particular attention paid here to rolling out USAID PRIORITAS teacher training modules, cost the delivery of those programs, identify multiple sources of funds, and create a budgeted CPD plan. This study also examines these CPD plans in a number of target districts.

Seven districts, three in Central Java and four in South Sulawesi, were chosen for the study. The TDP took place in all but one of the districts in each province. CPD plans were developed in all seven districts.

The investigation into the TDP and the CPD plans was conducted through a structured interview that was administered to government officials in all seven districts.

The findings for the TDP show that the willingness of affected parties impacted by the TDP; high level support for the TDP; and the leadership, motivation, and organizational culture of the district education office regarding the TDP, factored heavily into why some districts performed better than others. To the extent that the affected parties' willingness to be impacted by the TDP, and/or high-level support for the TDP were lacking in poor performing districts, it is recommended that USAID PRIORITAS support those districts in revising their TDP plans, such that the plans can help ensure willingness and help districts to gain the high level support needed for successful plan implementation.

There is a limit to the number of affected parties that can be motivated to agree to be impacted by a policy option aimed at addressing the teacher deployment issue. *Once this limit is reached, TDP plan implementation will be difficult to realize, mainly because of political resistance and the subsequent lack of high level support.* It is recommended that USAID PRIORITAS work with MOEC and a selected number of districts to seek, and to develop the capacity to seek, an optimal solution to the teacher deployment issue—one that finds an equilibrium between

the degrees to which the teacher deployment issue can be solved, costs, and political pushback. Implicit here is that the optimal solution in one district may not be the optimal solution in another.

For the CPD program, all but one district had a CPD plan in place. All CPD plans were similar in that they showed the number of teachers to be trained, the courses that would be used, the source of funds, and an overall budget. Funds-per-teacher varied widely across the seven CPD plans, which may reflect a lack of well-grounded understanding of what teachers' CPD needs really are, what costs are really needed to address those needs, and how much money districts can really get from various sources. Also, if USAID PRIORITAS' teacher training efforts are to be sustained, additional work will be required to help MOEC and the districts to put in place a more effective CPD system.

I Overview

USAID's Prioritizing Reform, Innovation, and Opportunities for Reaching Indonesia's Teachers, Administrators, and Students (PRIORITAS) project has, among other things, supported Indonesia's Ministry of Education and Culture's (MOEC) efforts to address their teacher deployment issue. This issue can be characterized by

- a general oversupply of teachers (average pupil-to-teacher ratio for primary school is 16 to 1);
- an undersupply of civil service teachers;
- an overabundance of temporary teachers;
- a mal-distribution of teachers among schools (some, mostly urban schools, have an excess of civil service teachers, while others, mostly rural/remote schools, have a deficit of civil service teachers);
- a large number of small schools, which tends to drive pupil-teacher ratio down; and
- a large number of female teachers who, because of marital/family obligations are not good candidates for transfer.

To help MOEC address the teacher deployment Issue, USAID PRIORITAS' Teacher Deployment Program (TDP) supported District Education Offices (DEO) to do the following:

- examine detailed data to characterize the size and nature of their respective teacher deployment issues;
- engender widespread ownership of the teacher deployment issue;
- decide how best to address their teacher deployment issue using any one or number of five policy options (see below);
- develop detailed plans to address their teacher deployment issue (to identify the exact schools to merge, the specific teachers to be transferred, etc.); and
- engender widespread ownership of the TDP plan.

Districts could address their teacher deployment issue through the following five policy options:

- merging small schools;
- creating multi-grade schools;¹
- transferring teachers;
- recruiting civil service teachers from the ranks of temporary teachers; and
- reclassifying teachers and non-teachers (i.e., reclassifying a junior-secondary school [SMP] teacher as a primary school [SD] teacher, assigning a subject specialist teacher to two schools as a mobile teacher, assigning multi-subject teachers).

¹ A multi-grade school is one in which teachers teach more than one grade at the same time (i.e., one teacher may teach grade 1 students and grade 2 students; one teacher may teach grade 3 students and grade 4 students, etc.).

The study presented in this report examines why some districts performed better or worse than others in the implementation of USAID PRIORITAS's TDP.² A relatively successful district was one that had reported back to USAID PRIORITAS on specific TDP accomplishments: the number of schools that were merged, the number of teachers successfully transferred, the number of reclassified temporary teachers, and so forth. Those districts that were determined to be relatively unsuccessful had, by the time this study took place, reported no such accomplishments.

It is important to note that despite the 2011 Joint Five Ministerial Edict³ mandating that the teacher deployment issue be addressed across all districts, no district had achieved any substantial improvements in teacher deployment prior to the TDP. Moreover, although uneven teacher deployment has been an issue for many years, and other donors, particularly the World Bank and USAID, have worked on resolving it in the past, success has been elusive. With one or two notable exceptions (Gorontalo District in particular), no district has made a substantial improvement in teacher deployment. Multi-grade schools and school mergers have been tried, but they have been very difficult to implement, and in the case of the former, have not been sustained. Thus, it would appear that USAID PRIORITAS's TDP has, in making progress on this issue, effected change and possibly shown the way forward.

USAID PRIORITAS has also helped the districts to develop CPD plans in an attempt to help sustain much of the CPD work it has supported over the life of the project. In particular, USAID PRIORITAS's CPD program helped the districts to

- analyze data to quantify and qualify teacher CPD needs and to help identify the teachers who needed training;
- develop a teacher training program to address those needs—choose the courses that would be used to train the teachers;
- determine the cost of delivering those programs; and
- create a budget for the delivery of the programs, drawing on funds from the government-allocated school operational assistance funds (BOS), the teachers' professional allowance (TPP), and district government funds.

This study also looked into why some districts “performed” better or worse than others in developing these CPD plans. Because these plans were not yet implemented by the time of this study, districts' performance on plan implementation could not be examined.

Both desk work (the review of relevant documents) and field work informed this study. The fieldwork took place over the course of a month: May 9–June 3, 2016. During this period, the author spent time with relevant project staff in the USAID PRIORITAS head office in Jakarta to (a) learn more about each program (TDP and CPD), (b) gather data about the teacher deployment issue in the districts that would be examined, and (c) obtain specific data on target districts' TDP and CPD programs. There were seven target districts examined in this study: three in Central Java (Central Java, District A [CJA]; Central Java,

² The Teacher Deployment Program is a USAID PRIORITAS effort designed to help target districts to address their teacher deployment issues. It started as a pilot in 2013 and continues now with varying levels of USAID PRIORITAS support to some districts.

³ This Edict was issued by the Ministers of Finance, Home Affairs, Education, Civil Service and Bureaucratic Reform, and Religion.

District B [CJB]; and Central Java, District C [CJC]) and four in South Sulawesi (South Sulawesi, District A [SSA]; South Sulawesi, District B [SSB]; South Sulawesi, District C [SSC]; and South Sulawesi, District D [SSD]).⁴ These districts were chosen because they represented a sample of districts that performed varying well and not-so-well on the TDP and CPD, as determined by USAID PRIORITAS staff. Geographic location (the amount of time it took to travel to each district), given the amount of time the author had in each province to conduct the study, also factored into the selection of the districts.

In each province or district, stakeholders who were closely involved in or were knowledgeable about both the TDP and/or CPD programs were interviewed about the programs. In addition to interviewing target province or district stakeholders, a number of USAID PRIORITAS staff and TDP and CPD service providers (SP) were also interviewed about the districts they served, many of which were not the target districts.⁵ This being the case, some of the findings presented in this report reflect the TDP and CPD situation beyond the seven target districts.

The methodology for this study included guided interviews with groups of districts' stakeholders. In every district, one meeting took place in which relevant staff responded to interview questions. For USAID PRIORITAS staff, SPs, and provincial education office stakeholders, a subset of specific questions, from among the set of questions asked of districts stakeholders, were asked in separate meetings.

For the TDP, the questions presented to these interviewees were shaped by two major considerations: (1) the nature of the program and (2) some hypothesized factors that could lead to differential results in district performance. The USAID PRIORITAS TDP for districts consisted of the following major steps:

1. Holding a series of workshops and providing on-the-job assistance, in which the teacher deployment data were jointly analyzed, strategic issues identified, and policy recommendations made for each district.
2. Drafting a report in follow-on to these workshops that quantified and qualified the teacher deployment issue in each district.
3. Sharing the report findings in multi-stakeholder forums (MSF) in which the districts discussed the findings and indicated the means by which they might address their teacher deployment issue (merging small schools; creating multi-grade schools; transferring teachers; recruiting civil service teachers from the ranks of temporary teachers; or reclassifying teachers and non-teachers).
4. Facilitating policy implementation workshops (PIW) in which the details of a TDP plan were discussed—the exact schools that would be merged, the teachers who would become mobile teachers, and the schools involved, and so forth.

⁴ CJA and SSC were Decentralized Basic Education (DBE) districts, as opposed to USAID PRIORITAS districts, and as such only the CPD program had unfolded there. Nevertheless, both were asked questions about their teacher deployment problem. A DBE district is a district that was impacted by USAID's Decentralizing Basic Education (DBE) project, the predecessor to USAID PRIORITAS.

⁵These service providers are individuals from partner teacher training institutes (TTIs), who are not project employees, but who are paid travel costs and a small daily honorarium to work with the program in the districts. The aim here is to help to build the capacity of the individuals and the TTIs so that they can further disseminate the programs to others and generally develop capacity as a service provider.

5. Following the PIW, districts were expected to develop and implement TDP plans.
6. Providing support by USAID PRIORITAS SPs for districts throughout this process, until the plans were developed (only in a few instances did USAID PRIORITAS SPs lend support in plan implementation).

Prior to when fieldwork for this study was conducted, the following factors were hypothesized as possibly contributing to a district’s relative success or failure in TDP plan implementation (see **Figure 1**).

Figure 1: Hypothesized factors contributing to a district’s relative success in the TDP

- Degree of high-level support for addressing the teacher deployment issue and implementing the TDP
- Cultural differences; the degree of political interference
- Degree to which the affected parties agreed to the policy option impacting them
- Organizational culture, leadership, and motivation of the district education office
- Difficulty of the means to address the issue
- Degree to which the work was considered everyday work by those implementing the policy option
- Lack of technical expertise implementing the policy options
- Structural barriers
- Relative importance of the teacher deployment issue
- Ownership of the teacher deployment issue and TDP
- Degree/nature of support provided by USAID PRIORITAS

Questions asked about the CPD program were shaped by the nature of the program and the information needed to determine the “relative success” of the planning effort. As noted earlier, USAID PRIORITAS’s CPD program consisted of the following major events and results:

- A workshop in which data about teacher needs was assessed;
- A workshops in which university and teacher training institute (TTI) service providers marketed their CPD offerings;
- A workshop in which needs, costs, and budgets, were determined; and
- A CPD plan (resulting from the final workshop), which would be shared by the district with district stakeholders and officially approved to allow implementation.

The CPD plans had not yet been implemented by the time this study took place. Accordingly, the relative success of each district was examined against the following criteria, as per USAID PRIORITAS:

- the number of teachers to be trained;
- the amount of money budgeted;
- whether or not USAID PRIORITAS teacher training modules were included in the CPD plan course offerings;

- the number of “legislative” documents produced in support of the plan (e.g., a district regulation requiring that 4% of the teachers’ professional allowance would be used for CPD, or a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a university service provider);
- the degree to which these plans were integrated into the district’s annual planning process; and
- the degree to which the CPD plans were integrated into the district’s 5-year strategic plans.

2 Background Information: Teacher Deployment Issue

Table 1 shows data that describe some overarching characteristics of the teacher deployment issue in the target districts. Three indicators are presented: (1) the primary school (SD) pupil-teacher ratio, (2) the percentage of undersupply (%US) of civil service teachers in each district, and (3) the percentage of temporary or non-civil service teachers in each district for (a) classroom teachers, (b) religion teachers, and (c) physical education (PE) teachers. The overall numbers across all teacher types are also presented.

The “%US” is defined as the number of official classes, minus the number of civil service teachers, divided by the number of official classes (policy dictates that every official class requires a civil service teacher; thus, the number of classes indicates the demand for civil service teachers). Therefore, if for 100 classes there are only 80 civil service teachers, the %US would be 20%. The percentage of temporary teachers is defined as the total number of temporary teachers, divided by the total number of classes (demand for teachers). Accordingly, a 40% figure for the percentage of temporary teachers in **Figure 1** connotes that 40% of the demand for teachers is met by temporary teachers.

Table 1: Percentage undersupply (%US) of civil service teachers, percentage temporary teachers (%Temp), and pupil-teacher ratio for primary school level

Districts	P/T ⁶	Classroom		Religion		PE		Overall	
		% US	% Temp	% US	% Temp	% US	% Temp	% US	% Temp
SSA	17.78	0.45	0.42	0.20	0.34	0.43	0.34	0.42	0.40
SSB	14.58	0.13	0.36	0.01	0.35	0.12	0.36	0.12	0.36
SSD	13.10	0.46	0.44	0.03	0.18	0.57	0.43	0.43	0.41
CJB	17.26	0.44	0.43	-0.28	0.16	0.42	0.47	0.37	0.40
CJC	17.44	0.18	0.21	0.20	0.30	0.29	0.26	0.20	0.23

Generally speaking, SSB and CJC districts have relatively smaller SD-level teacher deployment issues than do the rest of the target districts (see shaded cells). Of note is the

⁶ P/T: pupil-teacher ratio.

oversupply of civil service religion teachers in CJB district and the very low pupil-teacher ratio (P/T) for SSD district.

In **Table 2**, the %US and percentage of temporary teacher figures for junior-secondary (SMP) school level are shown for each subject teacher.

Table 2: Percentage undersupply (%US), of civil service teachers; percentage temporary teachers (%T) for junior-secondary school level

Subjects	CJC		CJB		SSB		SSA		SSD	
	%US	%T								
Indonesian ⁷	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.12	-0.13	0.20	-0.62	0.11	-0.32	0.26
English	0.26	0.20	0.08	0.15	-0.26	0.08	-0.10	0.28	0.19	0.39
Science	-0.06	0.07	-0.01	0.10	-0.46	0.10	-0.93	0.11	-0.49	0.26
Social Studies	-0.04	0.07	-0.08	0.09	-0.23	0.09	-0.77	0.14	-0.24	0.23
Mathematics	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.16	-0.38	0.10	-0.26	0.26	-0.03	0.31
Religion (Islam)	0.37	0.32	0.24	0.19	-0.70	0.08	-0.06	0.41	-0.17	0.47
Physical Education	0.24	0.12	0.04	0.11	-0.35	0.16	-0.52	0.22	-0.53	0.28
Civics	-0.02	0.03	-0.08	0.01	-0.50	0.06	-0.87	0.12	-0.89	0.17
Arts and Crafts	0.22	0.18	-0.06	0.05	0.05	0.32	-0.39	0.31	-0.52	0.35
ICT Information and Communication Technology	0.34	0.31	0.13	0.31	0.30	0.22	0.14	0.61	0.27	0.71
Total	0.13	0.12	0.04	0.13	-0.27	0.13	-0.47	0.23	-0.24	0.33

Note that a negative value indicates an oversupply of civil service teachers. Of interest here is that both of the USAID PRIORITAS districts in Central Java have an undersupply of civil service teachers, while all three USAID PRIORITAS districts in South Sulawesi have an oversupply of civil service teachers (see shaded cells).

The percentage of small schools (those with a P/T of 16 or less) in each of the target districts is presented in **Table 3**.

Table 3: Percentage of schools with an average class size of 16 or less

District	Percentage
SSA	30%
SSB	6.3%
SSD	56%
CJC	25%
CJB	32%

⁷ Indonesian and Bahasa Indonesia are used interchangeably throughout this document to indicate the primary language spoken in Indonesia.

SSB and SSD districts stand out as the extremes, with the former having the smallest percentage of small schools (6.3%) and the latter having the highest percentage of small schools (56%).

Although the relative size of the teacher deployment issue in each district has no bearing on how well the district performed, it will be interesting to see if the percentage of small schools impacted a district’s decision about what to do and whether or not that decision impacted how well the district performed. Specifically, SSD district has a preponderance of small schools. The policy options open to the district for these small schools are either to merge schools or to transition to multi-grade schools. If districts chose to merge schools, *and if that policy option is more difficult to implement*, it could be the reason why that district had no accomplishments to report.

To determine the difficulty of implementing each of the five policy options, each USAID PRIORITAS district, and USAID PRIORITAS staff in Jakarta and in each province, were asked which two of the five policy options are the most difficult to implement (administratively and politically), and which two are the easiest. The findings are shown in **Table 4**, rated on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 rated as being the easiest and 5 being the most difficult.

Table 4: The two most difficult and the two easiest policy options to implement

	PJK*	PCJ**	CJB	CJC	PSS***	SSA	SSD	SSB	Total 5 votes	Total 1 vote
Merge	5	5	5	5	5	5		5	7	0
Multi-grade	5			5			1		2	1
Transfer	1	1		1	5	5	5	1	3	4
Recruit	1	1	1		1	1	1 ⁸	5	1	6
Reassign (including mobile teachers)		5		1	1	1	1	1	1	5

*PJK: USAID PRIORITAS Jakarta Office

**PCJ: USAID PRIORITAS Central Java Office

***PSS: USAID PRIORITAS South Sulawesi Office with SPs and Provincial Education Officers

As Table 4 shows, merging schools was considered the most difficult to implement (receiving 7 “most difficult” votes), while recruiting was considered the easiest (receiving 6 “easiest” votes).

The relative success of each district in implementing the TDP is premised on the number of accomplishments that they reported to USAID PRIORITAS prior to the study. These accomplishments are presented in **Table 5**.

⁸ When asked which policy options were the most difficult, SSD included recruitment. Yet, when asked why they chose to do recruitment, they said because it was easy. As a result, the study team has put a 1 here.

Table 5: Reported TDP accomplishments by district

District	TDP accomplishments
CJB	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 81 SD transfers• 33 SMP transfers• 45 SMP mobile teachers• 28 reclassified SD teachers• 5 reclassified SMP teachers• Relevant legislation
CJC	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• 22 merged schools• 21 multi-grade schools• 82 transferred principals• 250 mobile teachers• Relevant legislation
SSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Relevant legislation
SSB	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• None
SSD	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• None

Given these data, CJB and CJC were judged to be relatively successful, while the rest were judged to be less successful.

3 The TDP Findings

Detailed responses from the district interviews are presented in **Annex A**. In this section, those findings are used to inform a discussion around whether or not the hypothesized reasons, or factors, for how a district performed (shown in **Figure 1**) are correct. These factors may overlap and are not distinct; for example, the “difficulty of the issue” may be directly related to political interference, which could flow from “cultural differences.”

3.1 Degree of high-level support for the TDP

The degree of high level support for the TDP proved to be a key factor in a district’s success or relative lack thereof. In those districts that had high level support—the approval of the District Head (DH) in particular, and that of the District Assembly (DA), the District Education Head (DEH), District Education Office (DEO) directors, and other district stakeholders—meaningful TDP accomplishments were realized (CJB, CJC, SSB, and SSC). In those districts where this support was lacking, the TDP plans were not implemented (SSA and SSD).

In CJB, the study team was told that one DEO director, who was also the head of the local teachers’ union, was not in favor of their TDP plan, but when the DH, a former army officer, told the DEO director that the TDP plan was to be implemented, the plan was implemented. In CJC, it was learned that the DH is also the head of the local teachers’ union, so with his *support* of the TDP (and the CPD), the teachers offered no resistance (although it must be noted that CJC’s TDP plan did not include teacher transfers, the

potentially most contentious of the policy options among teachers).⁹ One Central Java district that had not been included in this study had not reported any TDP accomplishments, but was nevertheless discussed. When asked why they had not accomplished anything, the response from the SP working with that district was that the DH, the DEH, and the Director of Human Resources in the DEO were all resistant to the school mergers.¹⁰

Before visiting South Sulawesi, the study team knew that in 6 out of 10 USAID PRIORITAS districts in Central Java, the TDP plan had been successfully implemented, while in South Sulawesi, only 1 out of 7 USAID PRIORITAS districts had met with success. When asked why this was the case, the people in Central Java had noted that there are cultural differences between the two regions and that political or patronage networks in South Sulawesi are much more prevalent. None of the three USAID PRIORITAS districts in South Sulawesi that the study team visited had officially reported any TDP results. Thus, when the study team discovered that SSB had successfully implemented much of their TDP plan and that SSC, a DBE district, had also done much to address their teacher deployment issue without any USAID PRIORITAS support, it was interesting to see that in both of these districts there was high level support for their teacher deployment issue to be addressed. In fact, there was quite a bit of high level support in SSC, where equitable quality education is highlighted in their 5-Year Strategic Plan.

Finally, with regard to SSA, the study team was told that the DH chose not to sign the TDP plan until after the local election. After the election, the team learned that he had signed it, but that it was a watered down plan with nothing to implement. This was verified after the study team had a chance to read the plan (the legislation that the district reported to the USAID PRIORITAS home office). High level support for specific actions to be taken proved to be a must for successful TDP plan implementation.

3.2 Cultural differences and political interference

To examine what, if any, cultural differences between Central Java and South Sulawesi could account for why the two regions performed differentially on the TDP, interviewees were told that in Central Java, 6 out of 10 USAID PRIORITAS districts reported accomplishments, while in South Sulawesi, only 1 out of 7 were able to do so. Interviewees were then asked if they could explain why there was such a marked difference and to suggest some cultural reasons between Central Java and South Sulawesi that could account for the difference. In Central Java, it was often mentioned that people in this province have a great respect for authority. Therefore, people tended to respectfully do as a leader requested or mandated. In saying this, the interviewees inferred that this was not the same in South Sulawesi. However, in South Sulawesi, when high level support was in place for addressing the teacher deployment issue, relevant measures were taken, and when that

⁹ A major finding of this study showed that when all the affected parties agree to being impacted by a particular policy option, high-level support for the TDP plan follows. However in this instance, high-level support for the TDP appears to have brought about “agreement” among those impacted by the policy options.

¹⁰ This begs the question, if school mergers had been taken out of their TDP plan, might they all have approved the remaining plan, or had USAID PRIORITAS intervened and helped persuade these leaders to agree to the mergers, or at least some schools being merged, might the plan have been approved?

support was not in place, measures were not taken; therefore, disproving what the interviewees in Central Java had inferred.

Another cultural difference noted was that the Central Javanese are fairly ethnically homogenous, as opposed to the people in South Sulawesi, where there are many ethnic groups. Interviewees also said that educational matters are much more political in South Sulawesi, whereas in Central Java, it was noted that “education is education, politics is politics, and the two do not mix.” When asked why educational matters are more political in South Sulawesi, the response among the Central Javanese answering the question was the much larger and tighter kinship networks that exist there, following along family and ethnic lines, and with patronage networks extending deep into the government.

In South Sulawesi, people’s responses resonated with some of what the study team had heard in Central Java: ethnic diversity, family ties, kinship networks, and political-patronage networks are much more prevalent in South Sulawesi than in Central Java, and they run deep into the echelons of government. People in South Sulawesi tend to be hired more for their family/ethnic ties, friendship bonds, and/or support that they gave during the past election than for their technical abilities. It was also said that teachers are very active in local politics and as such, most DHs are highly sensitive about the support they might be able to get from the teachers in the next election. As a result, these DHs eschew doing anything that might jeopardize that support (e.g., transferring teachers). The people in South Sulawesi also said that education was more highly valued in Central Java and that educational expenditure in South Sulawesi would tend to be channeled more toward capital (where it can reap political gain) than toward quality (which yields much less immediate political gain). In SSA, one district officer opined that their poor performance regarding TDP implementation was in part due to their not working “to the maximum” and that they had to increase their commitment to seriously address their teacher deployment issue. It was also noted that the teachers in Central Java were much more inclined to strive to advance professionally (and so be more willing to be transferred if it were professionally advantageous), while the teachers in South Sulawesi would rather stay at a school close to home.

SSB noted that the ethnic groups in South Sulawesi are not all alike and that the dominant ethnic group in their district is much more inclined to work together than with the dominant ethnic group in SSA. However, the dominant ethnic group in SSB is also the dominant ethnic group in SSC and SSD, and even though TDP results were generated in SSB and SSC, none were generated in SSD.

Thus, the cultural differences between Central Java and South Sulawesi would appear to help explain why Central Java performed better than South Sulawesi, even when factoring in the unreported accomplishments of SSB and SSC. Because education seems so much more political in South Sulawesi, high level support for meaningful action to address the teacher deployment issue appears to be more difficult to come by—it helps to explain why the TDP was not implemented in SSA and SSD.

3.3 Geography, outsiders, and the degree of infrastructural development

Three factors not hypothesized prior to the study, but that proved to be relevant (vis-à-vis TDP plan implementation), included geography, outsiders, and infrastructure. In particular, SSB is a very small district, no more than 10 km in diameter. That it is so small means that teachers cannot be transferred very far. This being the case, teacher transfer is not as problematic in SSB as it is in larger districts with more rural and remote areas. In this regard, geography helped to make SSB a successful TDP district. The study team also learned that SSB has a fair amount of “outsiders,” people coming in from elsewhere, and as such the family ties are not quite as strong there as elsewhere in South Sulawesi. Therefore, measures taken to address SSB’s teacher deployment issue would be met with less kinship network-related resistance.

Finally, it was noted that the level of infrastructural development in Central Java is much higher than in South Sulawesi, which means that “rural” is much less remote in Central Java than it is in South Sulawesi, which may account partly for why Central Java met with more success in TDP plan implementation in terms of transfers than South Sulawesi.

3.4 Affected parties’ extent of agreement with policy implementation

The extent of agreement to policy implementation proved to be a major factor in how well a district performed on the TDP. When measures were taken to ensure that all affected parties agreed to the policy option impacting them, the TDP plan was successfully implemented. When this was not done, the TDP plan was not implemented. In CJB and CJC, measures were taken to ensure that all the affected parties (teachers, schools, and others) agreed to the policy option impacting them: either teachers agreed to be transferred so that they could teach the required 24 lessons per week,¹¹ or they eventually agreed to being transferred (or to be impacted by some other policy option) through a collaborative effort in which they came to understand the issue and the reasons why they were chosen to help solve it. This collaborative effort was also used to help get schools to agree to merge. In CJB, stakeholders talked about the “personal approach” that they used to help get affected parties to agree to being impacted, an approach that is premised on three values: (1) reason, (2) empathy, and (3) two-way communication. It must also be noted that in CJC, stakeholders chose not to transfer teachers, because it can be a very contentious issue.

In South Sulawesi, not one teacher in SSB was transferred who had not agreed to being transferred. In SSC, the situation was the same—not one affected party disagreed to being impacted by the policy option. Yet, in SSA and SSD, it appears that no such effort was ever made, which explains in large part why their TDP plans were never implemented. This begs the question if such measures would have been taken, would they have gained the high level support needed for implementing the TDP plans.

¹¹ All primary school and junior secondary school teachers must teach a minimum of 24 lessons per week to obtain their monthly certification allowance (*Peraturan Pemerintah No. 74, 2008*). Therefore, a demand exists among some teachers to become a mobile teacher or to be transferred, such that they can teach the minimum 24 lessons per week.

3.5 Organizational culture, leadership, and motivation

Not all DEOs are alike. The organizational culture of one may be defined by motivation, while the organizational culture of another may be characterized by indifference or even fear. The organizational culture sensed in all the relatively successful districts was a positive one, specifically in CJB, CJC, and SSC. As for the degree of leadership and “internal force” driving these districts, the DEHs for CJC and SSC appeared to be exceptional leaders, and both districts seemed to have a high degree of motivation. Of note here is that both of these DEHs are women—the only women DEHs in the study.

This positive sense of leadership and motivation was not apparent in SSA and SSD. In SSA, it seemed that stakeholders simply did not want to talk about the TDP, much less exhibit any motivation to address their teacher deployment issue. In SSD, stakeholders seemed as though their hands were tied and that there was little they could do to address the teacher deployment issue without high level support. It is important to note here that teachers in SSD expressed little confidence in the managerial capabilities of the DEO. In this regard, it may be worth mentioning that SSD had the USAID PRIORITAS data analysis in hand; accordingly, they should have known which schools needed mobile teachers and from which schools mobile teachers could be supplied. Yet, SSD left the task of finding schools to which to assign mobile teachers up to the teachers themselves, potentially underscoring the teachers’ views about the DEO.

When people talk of the patronage networks in South Sulawesi, they mention fear: fear of upsetting the teachers, fear of losing one’s job, fear of not winning the next election, and so forth. This fear was evident in SSA and SSD. Stakeholders also talk about how people are more likely to be hired because they are friends and family of the hiring entities than for their technical and professional capabilities. To the extent that this is true, the organizational culture of a district that is staffed to varying degrees by friends and family, and in which there is a fair amount of fear, will be quite different from the organizational culture of a district that is not fearful and is staffed largely by highly skilled professionals whose career advancement is predicated more for how well they perform than for whose friend or family member they might be. The sensed organizational culture, both of SSA and SSD, was different in a negative sense from that found in the other the districts. To the extent that this difference can be attributed to a preponderance of fearful friends and family working in the district is impossible to discern in a 2–3 hour interview. Nevertheless, it is posited as a possibility. In conclusion, organizational culture, leadership, and motivation are factors that appear to impact significantly on TDP performance.

3.6 Relation of issue difficulty to chosen policy solution

It was hypothesized that the perceived (or real) difficulty of implementing the policy options that a district included in their TDP plans might have an impact on their TDP performance. On a scale from 1 to 5, **Table 6** shows how each district classified each policy option (5 signifies difficult, 1 signifies easy), the overall perceived difficulty of each policy option (total number of 5 votes and total number of 1 votes), and the policy options each district chose to implement in their TDP plan (marked with an “X”). Only two districts chose to implement policies that were difficult to do: CJC and SSD (see shaded cells). CJC succeeded in getting much of that difficult work done while SSD never implemented their TDP plan.

Table 6: The perceived relative ease/difficulty of implementing policy options to address the teacher deployment issue

	CJB	CJC	SSA	SSD	SSB	Total # 5 votes	Total # 1 votes
Merge	5	5X	5		5	7	0
Multi-grade	X	5X		1		2	1
Transfer	X	1X	5	5X	1X	3	4
Recruit	1X	X	1X	1X ^a	5	1	6
Reassign (mobile teachers)	X	1X	1	1X	1X	1	5

^aWhen asked which policy options were the most difficult, SSD included recruitment. Yet, when asked why they chose to do recruitment, they said because it was easy.

So, was the hypothesis correct? From an administrative perspective, it was not. Merging schools and creating multi-grade schools are, from an administrative perspective, rather difficult to do, yet both were successfully accomplished. Conversely, SSA and SSD chose administratively simple policy options to implement, and they were unable to carry out their plans. However, while transferring teachers can be administratively very simple to do, it can prove to be politically impossible to accomplish in some circumstances. It is feasible to transfer teachers in South Sulawesi if great care is used in the province’s political climate. SSC (not shown in the table below because they are not a USAID PRIORITAS district) successfully transferred a number of teachers because they adroitly got every teacher to agree to be transferred: either the teacher could, as a result of the transfer, teach the minimum 24 lessons per week, or they were incentivized to go to a remote school by offering them a Rp500,000 per month remote school allowance. *Forcing* teachers to go to another school in South Sulawesi (and even Central Java) would prove to be extremely difficult politically. From a political perspective, then, the difficulty of a policy option can indeed impact TDP performance. For example, after SSC has exhausted all efforts to transfer teachers who can be motivated to be transferred through the 24-lesson requirement or the remote school allowance, the question remains if SSC will be able to transfer any more teachers. From a political perspective, it may prove too difficult.

3.7 Requests to do work outside of the job description

Oftentimes donor projects ask government officials to carry out tasks that are not in their job descriptions. This being case, these government officials may see it as extra work; work that they are not required to do; and as such, work they might not do. However, this proved not to be the case for the TDP (or the CPD program). All the work that had to be done: examine data, develop plans, and the work of all five policy options is *routine* work for the districts. So this proved not to be a determining factor as to why some districts performed better than others.

3.8 Lack of technical expertise

Although the work of the five policy options may be routine, it is still possible that districts may not have had the technical expertise to do some of the work. USAID PRIORITAS did not offer any training on how to implement the five policy options. Nor could the study team test or assess for capability or expertise of target government officials regarding policy options implementation. Given that if CJB, CJB, SSB, and SSC had the technical wherewithal to implement their policy options, then lack of technical expertise should not have been a factor in SSA and SSD. However, SSA and SSD may possibly have an overabundance of friends and family staffing the district, as opposed to skilled bureaucrats, in which case lack of technical expertise could well have been a factor. But, because SSA's and SSD's TDP plans never reached the point of implementation, it was not a lack of technical expertise that led to their poor results. Although lack of technical expertise might have impacted TDP performance if the point of plan implementation had been reached, the two districts never reached that point. The lack of high-level support for the TDP led to the poor results.

The high degree of innovation evidenced in SSC was not found in SSA or SSD—neither SSA nor SSD put forth a robust TDP plan in which all affected parties agreed to be impacted by a policy option. Although it can be concluded that the lack of technical expertise *for implementing the five policy options* is not why some districts performed poorly, it can be posited that a lack of technical expertise *needed to put forth a robust TDP plan that was not contentious* might have been why SSA and SSD performed poorly.

3.9 Structural barriers

Structural barriers did present themselves in the TDP, most notably because central human resource systems cannot yet accommodate teachers who teach in multi-grade schools. Nor, as the study team was told, is there a teacher training program in place for teachers who teach in multi-grade situations.¹² Nevertheless, CJC was successful in creating a number of multi-grade schools, albeit not as many as they had initially planned.

Another major structural barrier involves districts that do not have ready access to the data they need to develop highly targeted TDP plans. The study team learned that schools complete various central data forms that then bypass the districts and are routed to the center. USAID PRIORITAS obtained the data from the center and made it available to the districts as part of the TDP. The case is not that the districts cannot obtain the data—it would appear that SSC did. But, to make data readily available to the districts, it could simply be routed through the districts to the center.

SSC was able to motivate a number of teachers to be transferred to rural schools because several of their rural schools are officially designated as “remote,” a designation that allowed SSC to access funds that pay each teacher an additional Rp500,000 per month.¹³ That more

¹² USAID PRIORITAS was able to provide training modules and recommend a consultant to a non-target TDP district, which successfully implemented multi-grade schools. Also, CJC conducted a self-funded study tour to a neighboring TDP district before implementing multi-grade solutions.

¹³ Temporary teachers were paid Rp500,000 per month from the annual district budget under the budget allocation code called *Tunjangan Guru Honor Daerah*. Civil service teachers were paid the incentive from the central budget under the budget allocation code *Tunjangan Guru Daerah Terpencil* (allowance for teachers in remote areas).

rural schools are not classified as remote certainly stands as a structural barrier for districts that need to transfer more teachers to rural schools, yet do not have access to these remote school funds. If more rural areas could fall under the “remote” designation, with the resultant access to additional teacher allowances, more teachers might be motivated to transfer to rural schools.

In SSA, stakeholders noted that one of the biggest obstacles (though arguably not really a structural barrier) they face, in terms of excess civil service teachers, is the number of married female teachers. Because of their family obligations, married female teachers are not good candidates to be transferred too far from their homes, which are usually also near where their husbands work.

Lastly, a specific district rule mandates that districts cannot spend more than 50% of their total budget on civil servant salaries. This limit presents a barrier that prevents districts from hiring as many civil service teachers as they need.¹⁴ It would be interesting to know how much of the current civil servant salary expenses in each district are expended for education, how much for civil service teachers, and how much the overall salary expenses would increase if every school had its full complement of civil service teachers. It begs the question if it is reasonable to hold this expense limit at 50% of the total budget?¹⁵

None of these structural barriers account for why a district performed better or worse than another on TDP plan implementation. Thus, structural barriers proved not to be a factor at this time. As the districts continue to try to decrease their teacher deployment issue, these structural barriers will likely begin to hamper successful TDP plan implementation unless measures are taken to reduce their deterring effects.

3.10 Priority of the teacher deployment issue

It was hypothesized that a district may have performed less well in TDP than another district because more urgent issues may have taken priority, resulting in postponing implementing their TDP plan until the more urgent issue was solved. Yet, all but one target district saw the teacher deployment issue as the most urgent issue facing the district; only in SSB did stakeholders note a more urgent issue, teacher competency; however, this did not deter them from implementing their TDP plan. Conversely, the teacher deployment issue was seen as the most urgent issue facing both SSA and SSD, yet they were unable to implement their TDP plans. This being the case, the study team concludes that the relative urgency of the teacher deployment issue did not impact TDP performance.

¹⁴ In all but one target district, the 50% limit has been reached, yet all have an undersupply of civil service teachers. As some civil service teachers retire, the districts may be allowed to replace them, but even here, the study team learned that in some districts stakeholders were unable to replace all the retired civil service teachers with new civil service teachers because of competing demands (and political considerations) in other sectors. The salaries of temporary teachers are not included in the pool of salaries that make up the 50%, so schools and districts are free to hire as many temporary teachers as they wish.

¹⁵ In the United States, salaries and benefits account for approximately 80% of the entire district education budget, indicating that the 50% limit in Indonesia may be rather low (see http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cmb.asp).

3.11 Ownership of the TDP

Throughout development, ownership plays a very important role in reform success. If a donor program is thrust upon host country actors—if they see it as something foreign, or something that is not *theirs*—while they may say “yes” during some superficial “buy-in” meeting, in all likelihood they will not implement it well, if at all, if they do not really “own” the effort. USAID PRIORITAS did much to ensure a significant amount of high level ownership both of each district’s teacher deployment issue and their TDP plan. When asked about ownership, every district said that they did, in fact, own their TDP plans. Thus, *in this sense*, ownership did not factor into TDP plan implementation. Yet, it is questionable if ownership really existed in SSA and SSD, where the TDP plans were not implemented because of a lack of high level support. So clearly, ownership is a key factor, if it translates into high level support, or lack thereof, for the TDP plan. It should also be noted that ownership involves more than mere verbal agreements about addressing a teacher deployment issue and implementing a TDP plan. Although those agreements were in place for SSA and SSD, they did not translate into real support for the TDP. This lack of support does not imply that SSA and SSD were in some way disingenuous, but rather that when participating in a large public event with multiple actors and many people pressing for ownership of and solution to an issue, it is easier to acquiesce. Therefore, although these efforts are valuable, there is more to actual ownership than what such measures can generate.

3.12 Degree of support provided by USAID PRIORITAS

For the TDP, USAID PRIORITAS staff provided the districts with the following kinds of support:

- Workshops in which the data were analyzed;
- MSF in which the findings were shared and decisions made by the districts as to the policy options they would likely implement to address their teacher deployment issue;
- PIW in which data was again analyzed and decisions made about which exact schools would be merged, which schools would become multi-grade schools, which teachers would be transferred, and more.;
- PIW follow-on, where district regulations were drawn up—the official document stating which schools would be merged, which teachers transferred, and more—constituting what could be deemed an official TDP plan; and
- Visits to the districts between these events, providing motivation and technical support where and when needed.

It is likely that the technical support USAID PRIORITAS’ offered was variable in quantity and quality. Provincial USAID PRIORITAS staff noted that some SPs were better than others. Nevertheless, every district got to the point where they had a list of specific things that they were going to do that had emanated from the PIW. Regardless of the quantity and quality of the support that USAID PRIORITAS might have provided in each district through to the end of the PIW, each district got to this point. It is only afterward that the quantity and quality of USAID PRIORITAS support provided by the SPs may have become a factor. After the

PIW, when asked if the district met resistance from the DH or the DA, and if the SPs helped to address the resistance, USAID PRIORITAS staff provided mixed responses. Some (Central Java) said that the SP intervened in SSB when there was some resistance to certain elements, both of their TDP and their CPD plans, and the SP helped to address that resistance. Yet, other USAID PRIORITAS staff, both in Central Java and South Sulawesi, said that staff only provided technical assistance up until the point of the PIW. Upon checking with the USAID PRIORITAS staff in SSA and SSD, this proved to be the case—no post PIW support was given by the SPs. This begs the question if the TDP plan would have been approved in SSD if the SP had suggested to them that they not include teacher transfers and other contentious elements. If the SPs had discussed with the DH, both in SSA and in SSD, about mobile teachers being apolitical, or that transferring teachers who want to be able to teach the minimum 24 lessons per week would be agreeable to them, might the TDP plans have been approved and subsequently implemented? It is quite likely that such support might have led to more favorable results in SSA and SSD, and as such, the degree and kind of support the SPs provide does matter in how well a district performed, especially in districts that met resistance. It may not have mattered much at all in districts that met with no resistance.

4 The CPD Findings

CPD findings are addressed in **Annex B**.¹⁶ Since the CPD Plans have not yet been implemented, the districts' plans were to be "judged" on the following indicators, as per USAID PRIORITAS' request:

- the number of teachers to be trained;
- whether or not USAID PRIORITAS teacher training modules were included among the course offerings of the plan;¹⁷
- the amount of money budgeted;
- the number of "legislative" documents produced in support of the plan (i.e., a district regulation requiring that 4% of the teachers' professional allowance would be used for CPD, or an MOU with a university service provider); and
- the degree to which these plans were integrated into the district's annual planning process and their 5-Year Strategic Plans.

The districts' performance on these indicators and on indicators added by the author, is shown in **Table 7**.

¹⁶ The detailed answers to the questions asked about the CPD plans are presented in **Annex B**.

¹⁷ The study team learned that the only credible teacher training materials in existence are those that have been produced under donor projects, starting with CLCC (UNICEF), MBE, DBE, and USAID PRIORITAS (all USAID funded). These are all similar and build on each other. Locally developed training materials tend to be theoretical papers, not practical training materials. This is why the districts and MOEC welcome these donor-developed materials and why their inclusion in the CPD plans is seen as a factor of success.

Table 7: Numerical aspects of each district's CPD plans

	CJA	CJB	CJC	SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
SD teachers to train	3358	1022	4948	2719	547	1400	4374
% total	100%	28%	100%	97%	75%	100%	100%
SMP teachers to train	0	225	1720	1330	363	760	828
% total	0%	21%	100%	89%	75%	100%	100%
Total teachers	3,358	1,247	6,668	4,049	910	2,160	5,202
Gov. funds (000)	600,000	385,000	328,021	377,346	0	4,793,872	NA
BOS funds (000)	1,019,162	915,454	959,514	54,310	227,600	444,072	535,398
TPP funds (5%) (000)	5,184,000	5,886,868	4,172,324	2,480,000	1,950,000	0	NA
Total funds (000)	6,803,162	7,187,322	5,459,859	2,911,656	2,177,600	5,237,944	NA
Funds per teacher (000)	2,026	5,764	819	719	2,393	2,425	NA
Funds per teacher US\$	149	424	60	53	176	178	NA
Gov. funds per teacher (000)	179	309	49	93	0	2,219	NA
Gov. funds per teacher US\$	13	23	4	7	0	163	NA
Includes USAID PRIORITAS modules	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	NA
MOU with TTI/U	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Legislation for % TPP	Yes 4%	Yes 4%	Yes	No	Not yet	No need	No
Dissemination	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	NA

The Table 7 data likely should not be considered as “performance” data. For example, the total number of teachers to be trained hinges in large part on how many teachers there are to train. CJC has nearly twice the number of teachers as CJA, and both plan to train 100% of them. It is not possible to determine in what way CJC performed better than CJA in this regard. If SSB believes that it is best to only train 21% of its teachers, it is appropriate to say that they performed less well than those districts that aim to train all of their teachers.

The amount of BOS money hinges on how many schools there are, the amount of TPP money hinges on both how many teachers there are *and* the percentage of the TPP that the district *and the teachers* come to agree upon to help pay for the training. Because the political environment in these districts is quite different, getting 3% of the TPP in one district may prove to be more of an accomplishment than getting 6% in another. Moreover, SSC, a very high performing district on the TDP has, *for political reasons that proved to be very smart in the TDP*, chosen not to tap these TPP funds for their CPD. Can what proved to be a smart thing to do under the TDP be seen as a smart thing to do under the CPD? Moreover, in lieu of these TPP funds, SSC has acquired the most government funds of all the districts, a remarkable success, albeit in a district that has equitable high quality education as a pillar of its 5-Year Strategic Plan.

Having an act of legislation in place only means that the teachers have (may have) agreed to pay a certain percentage of the TPP, yet in SSC the DEO has chosen not to acquire this money (and for a sound reason), so the presence of an act of legislation should probably not be used to measure district success in CPD plan development. All but one district had an

MOU in place with a TTI or university, yet SSA maintains that the staff of the Provincial Education Office (PEO) Quality Assurance (QA) department will serve as their teacher training resource. The question arises if this might suffice for SSA, or *must* they instead have an MOU in place with a TTI or university for their CPD plan to be considered a success.

Finally, since CPD has, in the past, been included in each district's 5-Year Strategic Plan, and as such, included in their annual plans, CPD plan integration into these plans should not be a criterion for deeming one CPD plan better than another.¹⁸

It is interesting to see how much money is budgeted *per teacher to be trained*, and how much government money is budgeted *per teacher to be trained*. With regard to the overall amount of money budgeted per teacher to be trained, CJB is the highest with a value of US\$424 and SSA the lowest with a value of US\$53 (and a median value of US\$162 across all the districts). With regard to the amount of government funds allocated per teacher to be trained, SSC has the highest at US\$163 and SSB the lowest with US\$0 (and a median value of US\$10 across the districts). Although it may seem that SSC has performed in an outstanding way, being able to obtain from their own government budget this much money per teacher to be trained (US\$163), can it be attributed entirely to their "performance," or does a good part of this "success" result from the political milieu in SSC, where there is such a strong degree of high level support for equitable high quality education?

Although these per-capita figures could be used to judge CPD plans, the fact that they vary by such a wide margin raises some concerns. For example, what is CJB planning to do that costs eight times more on a per-teacher basis than what SSA is planning to do? Do these plans reflect an in-depth understanding of teacher needs, how best to address those needs, and what it costs to address those needs? Do they reflect a realistic appreciation of how much money they can actually obtain from various sources of funds? It may be best not to judge the quality of a CPD plan until there is a viable explanation for why the per capita figures vary by such a wide margin.

5 Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 Teacher deployment

A summary of the findings of this study is presented in **Table 8**. It shows, by the order in which it is listed, that the most important factor contributing to TDP plan implementation is the degree to which affected parties agreed to the policy option impacting them. Without this agreement, it is quite unlikely that successful districts would have been able to gain the much needed high level support. Although it is possible that in CJB, CJC, SSB, and SSC high-level support was already in place and that measures were then taken to ensure that all affected parties would agree to the policy option, it is quite likely that had these measures not been not taken, the high level support would have waned. Clearly, both the high level support and the measures to get affected parties to agree to the policy option are critical, as

¹⁸ For many years, districts have had in-service training in their plans and budgets, but generally speaking, this has only extended to single training events for a very small percentage of teachers—and tends to include training focused on administration as well as professional development. The CPD program is promoting that all teachers should receive routine CPD on an ongoing basis and that this be a part of their formal plans.

well as the ownership of the teacher deployment issue and the TDP that translates into high level support.

Technical expertise vis-à-vis policy option implementation proved not to be a factor. However, a DEO's inability (lack of technical expertise) to put forth a plan, in which all the affected parties agreed to the policy option, might have been a major reason why TDP plans did not get the high-level support needed, to be implemented in SSA and SSD. This means that SP support in districts, where contentious plans are put forth and/or where resistance is met, could be vital in promoting successful TDP plan implementation.

Table 8: Summary account of the findings

Factor	Did the factor have an impact on TDP plan implementation/explanatory comments	
	Impact	Comment
Degree to which the affected parties agreed to the policy option impacting them	Yes	
Degree of high-level support for addressing the teacher deployment issue and implementing the TDP plan	Yes	
Ownership of the teacher deployment issue and TDP	Yes/No	To the extent that there was no high level support for the TDP, it can be said that there was no ownership (in spite of all the work that USAID PRIORITAS did to engender widespread ownership of the teacher deployment issue and TDP plans).
Lack of technical expertise implementing the policy options	No/Yes	For the policy options, this did not play a role in TDP plan implementation; from an ability to put forth a non-contentious plan, it might have played a role.
Degree/nature of support provided by SPs	Yes/No	When SPs supported districts where there was resistance, that resistance was overcome; where they did not do this in districts where there was resistance, the TDP plans were not implemented.
Organizational culture, leadership, and motivation	Yes	This mattered to varying degrees.
Cultural differences; the degree of political interference	Yes	The cultural differences between Central Java and South Sulawesi help to explain why SSA and SSD did not implement their TDP plans; yet, these cultural differences were overcome in SSC and did not come into play in SSA.
Difficulty of the means to address the issue	Yes/No	From an administrative perspective, this did not play a role in TDP plan implementation; from a political perspective, it did.
Geography, outsiders, and infrastructure	Yes	The size of SSA, the fact that there are many outsiders in SSA, and the fact that infrastructural development is less in South Sulawesi than in Central Java all played a role in TDP plan implementation.
Structural barriers	Not yet	Various structural barriers did not account for why some districts performed better than others in TDP plan implementation, but as districts further their TDP efforts, they will play a role.
Degree to which the work was considered everyday work	No	
Relative importance of the teacher deployment issue	No	

The factors of organizational culture, leadership, and motivation of the DEO also played an important role in TDP plan implementation, although there was a wide range exhibited

among the successful districts, with CJC and SSC manifesting very high levels of all three, CJB showing high levels, and SSB revealing a moderate level of all three. Cultural differences between Central Java and South Sulawesi help to explain why TDP plans were not implemented in SSA and SSD. The difficulty of implementing various policy options within a plan proved not to be a factor from an administrative perspective; however, from a political perspective, some policy options, in particular teacher transfers, will become increasingly difficult to implement as fewer parties agree to being impacted by a particular policy option.

Geography and outsiders help to explain why TDP plan implementation could more easily unfold in SSB than elsewhere in South Sulawesi. And, the relative lack of infrastructural development in South Sulawesi might help to explain why it will soon become more difficult in South Sulawesi than in Central Java to transfer teachers to remote/rural schools. Structural barriers did not prevent districts from implementing their TDP plans, although CJC was unable to create all the multi-grade schools it had planned to create. However, as districts further their TDP efforts, some structural barriers will begin to have a negative impact on TDP plan implementation.

5.1.1 Recommendations

Given these findings, the following measures are recommended. First, in every district where TDP plans have not been implemented, USAID PRIORITAS should examine why. This examination should include the following questions:

1. Has the district put forth a contentious plan?
2. Have measures not been taken to ensure that all affected parties agree to being impacted by a particular policy option?

If either proves to be true, then USAID PRIORITAS should work with and develop the capacity of the districts to address these two issues. After completion, USAID PRIORITAS can support the district to then advocate for plan execution among the DH and DA to obtain their support. More generally, the MOEC can continue to advocate for action to be taken by all districts in their efforts to address their teacher deployment issue.

Doing the above may improve a DEO's organizational culture, leadership, and motivation *as it pertains to the TDP*. For example, the study team was told that SSA has a high level and positive organizational culture, leadership, and motivation *when it comes to CPD*. If USAID PRIORITAS helped them to put forth a non-contentious TDP plan, and they got high level support for implementing it, the high level and positive organizational culture, leadership, and motivation that they have for CPD could well be directed toward the TDP. In districts that simply lack a vibrant organizational culture, leadership, and motivation, it may be necessary for the MOEC to put forth more exacting and transparent hiring and promotion standards for DEHs and DEO directors, in an attempt to counter the negative impact that kinship networks have on the caliber of staff hired in some districts. To the extent necessary, USAID PRIORITAS can support the MOEC in this regard.

USAID PRIORITAS may also help the MOEC to consider and delineate teacher deployment issue performance indicators for the districts (i.e., percentage reduction in mal-distribution of civil service teachers between schools) along with some incentives (i.e., additional funds

for merged schools) and/or sanctions (i.e., withdrawal of some centrally allocated funds) should the districts not meet their teacher deployment issue performance targets. However, great care should be taken with the sanctions, given that at some point, the political costs of addressing the teacher deployment issue may simply become too high in many districts.

Getting affected parties to agree to being impacted by a policy option will become increasingly difficult. There is a finite pool of teachers, who are willing to be transferred to be able to teach 24 lessons per week and/or be able to teach in a class of 20 students or more. There are a limited number of remote schools for which the remote school stipend of Rp500,000 per month can be used to incentivize teachers to teach there, and there are only a certain number of teachers that can be incentivized to go to these remote schools for Rp500,000 per month. In addition, there are only a limited number of schools that might be willing to be merged under the present conditions. And, until the center makes it easier for schools to become multi-grade schools, this option cannot be fully exercised.¹⁹ In these regards, USAID PRIORITAS can support the MOEC to address some of the structural barriers that now do, and soon will, stand in the way of further addressing the nation's teacher deployment issue.

In particular, USAID PRIORITAS can support the MOEC to ensure that central personnel data systems are able to accommodate multi-grade teachers, small classes (where they cannot be merged), mobile teachers, and multi-subject teachers. USAID PRIORITAS can also support the MOEC to design teacher training programs for multi-grade teachers.²⁰

Because the Rp500,000 per month stipend was successfully used by SSC to incentivize teachers to be transferred to remote schools, it may be helpful for USAID PRIORITAS to support the MOEC (and the districts) to see what impact (a) raising the remote school stipend, and (b) altering the definition of remote schools to include additional rural schools, might have on the teacher deployment issue. It is recommended to conduct some action research in a small number of pilot districts to determine if either of these policies would increase the number of teachers willing to be transferred to schools where they are needed, and perhaps USAID PRIORITAS could help design these action research efforts.

Currently, districts are not allowed to spend more than 50% of their budget on salaries for civil servants. It would be interesting to examine how this rule may be limiting the education sector's ability to hire the civil service teachers it needs (as per the curriculum). Given this rule, can every teacher in the system be a civil service teacher? If not, under what conditions might it be possible (e.g., minimal class sizes of 30-to-1 instead of 20-to-1)? USAID PRIORITAS can support the MOEC to conduct this analysis. If it proves to be impossible to hire the required number of civil service teachers, then USAID PRIORITAS' support could advocate with MOEC for the limit to be raised above 50%.²¹

¹⁹ Partly as a result of USAID PRIORITAS's TDP work and national-level advocacy, multi-grade schools, small-school mergers, and assignment of mobile teachers all appear as approved strategies in the district governments' 5-Year Strategic Plans and in MOEC's 5Year Strategic Plan. However, this has not yet translated into amended regulations or changes to the national personnel data system (DAPODIK).

²⁰ As noted earlier, USAID PRIORITAS has multi-grade teacher training modules that have been used in some districts. The MOEC could simply adopt these.

²¹ As noted earlier, in the United States, approximately 80% of a district's education budget is for salaries, so this 50% figure is likely to be quite low.

Beyond these structural issues, the fact remains that Indonesia has an oversupply of teachers. One remedy could involve support to MOEC to identify ways to curb, if not entirely stop, the intake of temporary teachers. Additionally, USAID PRIORITAS could support MOEC in examining how it might support the districts in releasing a large number of these temporary teachers.²²

Also, USAID PRIORITAS can support MOEC to determine exactly how many education staff are not classroom teachers (non-teachers). Given this number, what is the teacher/non-teacher ratio? If under five (the number found in more efficient education systems), what can be done to release a number of non-teachers?²³ And what can be done to ensure that any savings that accrue from the released personnel are returned to the MOEC?

Another consideration may be the establishment of a rural or remote education department with its own set of service standards, staffing policies, and salary scales that are separate from those of the rest of the system. It is likely that it may be necessary to pay rural or remote civil service teachers more than three times the salary of an urban civil service teacher, if Indonesia is determined to provide an equitable high quality education. Also, class sizes with a pupil-teacher ratio of 20-to-1 may be impossible to maintain in some remote schools. As well it may prove to be unaffordable to have one teacher for every class in many small rural schools.

The teacher deployment issue may never be entirely solved. As stated earlier, there is limit to the number of affected parties who will be willing to be impacted by a particular policy option under the present conditions. Beyond this limit, there will likely be political resistance. To what extent can the “present conditions” change, allowing for the above mentioned limit to be extended and more of each district’s teacher deployment issue to be addressed? Or put another way, can USAID PRIORITAS support MOEC and the districts to seek an optimal solution to the teacher deployment issue, one that achieves an equilibrium between the amount of teacher deployment issue solved, affordability, and political resistance?

Table 9 presents a list of actions, or variables, that have cost (financial and political) and/or savings implications. It is recommended that USAID PRIORITAS work with MOEC and a representative sample of districts to get the data needed to begin to examine the costs and savings of various measures aimed at finding this optimal solution to each district’s teacher deployment issue.

²²There is a large contingent of new teachers coming through the TTI system—a lot more than is required to cover an anticipated 30% attrition rate over the coming 10 years. According to a recent study conducted by the Paramadina Public Policy Institute, some 1,440,000 students are enrolled in Indonesia’s 429 TTIs, generating 300,000 new teachers every year. For temporary teachers, it may be possible for some to become assistant teachers and/or “substitute” teachers to cover permanent teacher absences.

²³This analysis would examine the teacher-to-non-teacher ratio for all teachers, only for existing civil service teachers, and for the required number of civil service teachers, as well as for various teacher-demand scenarios, such as a 30-to-1 minimum class size.

Table 9: Potential actions to resolve the teacher deployment issue

Actions	Financial Impact/Comments	Political Impact
<i>All schools</i>		
Release temporary teachers	Savings: As an increasing number of temporary teachers are released, increased savings can be accrued (assuming that MOF allows MOEC and the districts to keep those savings).	Since temporary teachers are hired on an annual basis, it is quite likely that if their contract was not renewed, there would be limited, if not little, political impact.
Hire the required number of civil service teachers	Cost: At present, there is a general undersupply of civil service teachers; what will it cost to resolve this undersupply? Since civil service teachers are more costly than temporary teachers, this action will represent a net cost to the overall effort, which could partly be paid from the savings accrued from releasing temporary teachers; but more savings will have to be generated by increasing the minimum class size from a 20-to-1 pupil-teacher ratio to a 25-to-1 or 30-to-1 ratio (see below).	To the extent that civil service teachers replace temporary teachers, the loss of temporary teachers could present some political resistance.
Establish teacher deployment issue performance standards and targets	NA	While the center can put these performance standards and targets in place, at some point, there will be resistance from personnel unwilling to be impacted by particular policy options; action research may be able to determine when and under what policy conditions this resistance begins to become problematic
Determine the maximum number of teachers, who can be motivated to be affected by a policy option, to teach the minimum 24 lessons per week; how many teachers are left?	Only a certain number of teachers can be incentivized to decrease the teacher deployment issue by using the 24-lesson factor; what is this number and how many remain?	There will be no political resistance until teachers refuse to be transferred under any circumstances, at which point a limit may have been reached; action research may be needed to know when this limit is reached. ^a
Determine the maximum number of teachers, who can be motivated to be affected by a policy option, to teach in a class with a 20-to-1 pupil-teacher ratio; how many are left?	Only a certain number of teachers can be incentivized to help address the district's teacher deployment issue by using the 20-to-1 pupil-to-teacher class size factor; what is this number?	There will be no political resistance until teachers refuse to be transferred under any circumstances, at which point a limit may have been reached; action research may be needed to know when this limit is reached.

Actions	Financial Impact/Comments	Political Impact
Increase 50%	Additional funds: The costs identified in this paper may outweigh the savings. Accordingly, additional funds may be needed, some of which could come from lifting the 50% limit in the proportion of the district budget that can be spent on civil service personal. If every teacher were a civil service teacher, what would this do to the percentage (would it increase to 65%)? What could be done to reduce that percentage: reduce the number of non-teachers (see below); increase the minimum class size (see below)? Must the percentage limit be raised as part of an optimal solution to the teacher deployment issue?	The political impact here will not be in the form of resistance to the system by people disagreeing to be affected by a teacher deployment issue policy option, but rather in a more general sense—resistance from other sectors that may lose funds as the education sector may increase funds, or general resistance from MOF about the 50% limit.
Determine the teacher-to-non-teacher ratio; release non-teachers to the extent possible	Savings: If the teacher-to-non-teacher ratio is less than 5 to 4, then determine the savings that can be accrued if enough non-teachers were released to increase this ratio to 8 to 1. Those savings can be used to cover some of the costs described in this table, including “golden handshakes” ²⁴ for some of the non-teachers.	To the extent that some of the people being released are not soon to retire, and to the extent that others are not motivated to leave with a “golden handshake,” there will be a political cost here; action research will be needed to determine how effective “golden handshakes” are, by the amount offered.
Non-rural/remote schools		
Increase the 20-to-1 pupil–teacher ratio ; release more teachers	Savings: The system could generate savings by increasing the minimum class size; the higher this pupil–teacher ratio goes (25-to-1, 30-to-1), the more savings the system can generate by releasing teachers and/or hiring fewer teachers.	To reap these savings, teachers will have to be released; if they are civil service teachers, this has a political cost that may be overcome, to a point, with a “golden handshake” (see below). The first to be released should be those close to or ready for retirement. ^b

²⁴ A financial incentive to leave the system.

Actions	Financial Impact/Comments	Political Impact
Provide golden handshakes	<p>Cost: To reduce the political cost of releasing all teachers (and non-teachers), it may become necessary to offer “golden handshakes”—a financial incentive to leave the system.</p> <p>Variables: The number of golden handshakes offered and the unit cost of the golden handshake.</p> <p>Comment: These golden handshakes can be paid for by the savings accrued from releasing the teachers; as long as the cost of the handshakes does not equal the savings that are accrued, there will be a net savings from releasing teachers; these savings can be used to help pay for other costs listed in this table.</p>	Golden handshakes can reduce the political impact of releasing these civil service teachers, but only some teachers will accept the offer; beyond this, resistance may result in a number of teachers remaining in the system. MOEC and the districts may have to prepare themselves to do some very rigorous reform support work. ^c
Rural/remote schools		
Merge as many schools as possible	<p>Savings: As more schools are merged, more savings can be accrued from released personnel, and more efficient use of facilities and equipment achieved, but this has a limit because only a certain number of schools can realistically be merged.^d</p> <p>Estimate what these savings could be by studying a number of potential school mergers in sample districts.</p>	<p>There may be a political cost for personnel who are released, but this cost may be rather minimal due the small number of people who may need to be released.</p> <p>Parental/community resistance may occur, which could be offset by targeted advocacy.</p>
Create as many multi-grade schools as possible from those that cannot be merged	<p>Costs/Savings/Costs: Those small schools that cannot be merged can become multi-grade schools (how many?); creating multi-grade schools has a cost in that teachers need to be trained to teach in multi-grade settings. To the extent that some teachers may have to be released to allow for creating these multi-grade schools, savings may result at a political cost.</p>	To the extent that teachers have to be released, a political cost may result that could be offset by golden handshakes (see previous discussion on golden handshakes).
Establish realistic service ratios	<p>Cost: While in many urban schools it is possible to increase the minimum pupil–teacher class size to 25-to-1 or maybe even 30-to-1 (and generate net savings), many rural schools may not be able to reach class sizes of even 15-to-1; nor will some teachers be able to teach the minimum 24 lessons per week; and finally, rural/remote teacher salaries will have to increase to incentivize high quality civil service teachers to teach there, all of which represent a net cost that can be calculated and that can be determined for a designated number of rural/remote schools and teachers.</p>	None in the sense of teachers being dismayed or distressed.
Increase remote school stipend	<p>Cost: How many teachers can be transferred to remote schools with the current stipend of Rp500,000 per month; how many more can be incentivized if this stipend were increased; at what point does this stipend become too expensive, at what point does it no longer</p>	There will be no political resistance until teachers refuse to be transferred under any circumstances, at which point a limit may have been reached.

Actions	Financial Impact/Comments	Political Impact
	incentivize teachers to go to remote schools? Action research will be needed to see how teachers react to various amounts of financial incentive; the actual numbers can be modeled.	
Increase the number of remote schools	Cost: If the criteria were changed for how schools are classified as remote, to increase the number of rural schools that can qualify for the remote school stipend, what impact might this have on the teacher deployment issue and on overall costs to the system? More schools will become classified as remote schools, meaning that more teachers can be incentivized to go to those remote schools with the remote school stipend; this too can be modeled from a numerical perspective.	

^a Every teacher interviewed in SSD said that they would agree to being transferred if it meant that they could teach the minimum 24 lessons per week. They also said that they do not want to be transferred. Action research will be needed to determine how many teachers can be transferred using this incentive.

^b USAID PRIORITAS has data on the number of teachers who are going to retire over the course of the next 5–10 years. This information will be a very important element in the analysis being described in this table, for they will be the easiest to release. Hopefully, USAID PRIORITAS can obtain similar data for all non-teachers (people on the education payroll who are not classroom teachers).

^c Political resistance, or addressing the political economy of education reform, can be dealt with in two ways. The first is to keep doing things to prevent the resistance from happening—provide incentives to affected parties such they come to agree to being impacted by a policy option. The other, usually done when the first approach has reached its limits, is to directly confront the forces of the political economy using a number of techniques outlined in 7 documents under the title Education Reform Support (see *References*).

^d The current regulation stipulates that schools that are 3 km or less apart can merge. When one considers just how far 6 km are for a grade 1 or grade 2 student to walk *to and from* school, this regulation may have to be changed.

A small spreadsheet model would allow USAID PRIORITAS, MOEC, and the districts to see how all the costs and savings described in **Table 9** interact under varying circumstances and enable them to gain a general sense of what an optimal solution to the teacher deployment issue might entail. After potential action research is carried out to see how people react to various stipends and golden handshakes, it should be possible to gain a more refined sense of how a solution might look.²⁵

5.2 CPD

The USAID PRIORITAS CPD Program was developed to help sustain the CPD work in which USAID PRIORITAS has been deeply involved.²⁶ While viable CPD plans are an important aspect of this goal, sustainability of USAID PRIORITAS' CPD work will hinge

²⁵ Some of the work outlined here can build off the cost-benefit work that USAID PRIORITAS has already completed as part of the TDP.

²⁶ USAID PRIORITAS has been working at the district level and promoting school- and cluster-level CPD as a more cost efficient way of doing CPD than the traditional top-down approach taken by MOEC. It is too early to judge the CPD program, but the level of dissemination of USAID PRIORITAS training that has already taken place, and on which the CPD program is based, is an indicator of the likely success of this approach. The approach to funding CPD with a mix of district, school, and individual teacher funding is unique to USAID PRIORITAS and while it is too early to judge success, it is innovative and has been taken up successfully in a number of districts. CPD planning/budgeting has been rolled out to 90 districts and USAID PRIORITAS is in the process of working with them to integrate the results into 5-Year Strategic Plans.

largely on the education system's institutional, systemic, and organizational capacity to do the following well:

1. Assess teachers' needs;
2. Develop or offer CPD programs to address those needs;
3. Cost both 1 and 2 as well as the delivery of those programs;
4. Find the funding needed to pay for items 1–3; and
5. Deliver those programs to teachers who need them.

Do these capacities exist yet within the education sector? Do they come together as an effective “CPD system?”

Teachers' needs assessments have been conducted in a variety of ways that involved the following:

1. Teachers' performance on the national teacher competency exam;
2. Whether or not teachers have received USAID PRIORITAS training; and
3. The teacher performance appraisal that is conducted by the teacher's principal.

Do these means suffice, or are more needed to ensure that within the education system (within the center, the provinces, the districts, the schools), teachers' real needs can be adequately assessed? Does the system have the capacity to develop and deliver CPD programs that address the above-identified teachers' needs? Do linkages exist between those who assess teachers' needs and those who develop CPD programs, to ensure that CPD programs are needs-based? Do the TTIs and universities have the skills and resources needed to develop and/or edit CPD programs premised on the assessed needs? What happens if a curriculum is changed? Are linkages in place to ensure that TTIs and universities can develop CPD programs that can train teachers on how to implement the new curriculum and/or use new curriculum materials? These are all important issues to take into consideration.

For costing, have measures been taken to determine how much training teachers should get annually/biannually/tri-annually and how much it will cost? Has a minimum teacher-training-days-per-teacher-per-annum (or bi-annum) been established?²⁷ Has this been costed? Has this cost been translated into a minimum percentage of the districts' non-personnel recurring budget to be spent annually on CPD? Can MOEC require that a certain percentage of the BOS and a certain percentage of the TPP be used for CPD? These are other important issues to consider.

The above questions flow from the mental construct of an effective *CPD system*. In such a system, there exist five main functions: curriculum, curriculum materials, teacher training, mentoring, and student assessment. From an early grade reading (EGR) perspective, the curriculum function must have the capacity to develop, test, and revise EGR curricula (curriculum standards, learning objectives, benchmarks, time on task, and more.) that reflect international best practice. This curriculum function must then be institutionally linked to the curriculum materials function, so that the EGR curriculum can be well-embodied in various curriculum materials such as textbooks, supplemental reading materials, teacher

²⁷ Minimum services standards are currently being discussed within MOEC; it would be of benefit for USAID PRIORITAS to help inform these discussions.

guides, and more. The curriculum materials function must not only have the skills to develop these materials, but to test them, and to ensure that they are printed and distributed such that the correct number of the correct materials reach the correct schools on time.²⁸

An institutional linkage is also needed between both the curriculum function and the curriculum materials function and the teacher training function, to ensure that teachers are trained to teach the curriculum and use the curriculum materials. To this end, the teacher training function must have the skills to develop and test the training programs and the training materials, as well as implement those programs such that all teachers gain the skills they need to teach the EGR curricula and use the EGR curriculum materials. Teachers must then teach the curriculum and use the materials.


To ensure that teachers have the *in situ* support they need to do this effectively, they must receive adequate coaching. To this end, a viable coaching function must be in place, one that is premised in part on the skilled use of well-designed classroom observation tools that can identify what EGR teachers are doing well and where they might need additional support. This coaching function might also have the capacity to deftly collect and analyze classroom observation data and identify both *teachers in need* and *teachers' needs* across a number of teachers. With regard to the former, the coaching function should be able to provide targeted support to those teachers in need. As for the latter, there should be an institutional/systemic linkage between the coaching function and the teacher training function, allowing needs that exist across a wide cross-section of teachers to be addressed through tailored teacher training programs developed and implemented by the teacher training function.

There must also be an institutional link between the curriculum function and the student assessment function. Here, staff must have the skills to develop, test, and administer the instruments that can test the students on how well the EGR learning objectives have been met. This assessment function must also have the capacity to analyze the results of these assessments and disseminate them to all the curriculum implementation actors, allowing each one to see how well these learning objectives are being met, to reflect on *their* role within this CPD system, and to take the necessary measures needed to improve the work they are doing to effect student performance improvement.

Such a CPD system is illustrated in **Figure 2**.

²⁸ An element of the curriculum materials function may include private sector actors.

Figure 2: CPD System



To the extent that such an effective CPD system is not in place and fully institutionalized, it is recommended that USAID PRIORITAS work with MOEC, Provincial Education Departments, and DEOs, to do the following:

- Map the existing CPD system;
- Facilitate a stakeholder forum in which a detailed vision of a more effective CPD system is developed;
- Define the measures needed to transform the existing CPD system into the envisioned CPD system;
- Support MOEC, Provincial Education Departments, and DEOs to implement those measures; and
- Ensure that funding is in place for it to work as intended.

Annex A: Teacher Deployment Program

This annex contains the “raw data” about the TDP that was gathered during the interviews that were conducted in the target districts. It also contains author reflections written within 24 hours of the interviews and meetings.

Questions and answers from the structured interviews

Do you believe that there is a teacher deployment issue in this district?

District A in Central Java (CJA)	District B in Central Java (CJB)	District C in Central Java (CJC)
Yes	Yes	Yes

District A in South Sulawesi (SSA)	District B in South Sulawesi (SSB)	District D in South Sulawesi (SSD)
Yes	Yes	Yes

What is the *nature* of the teacher deployment issue in this district?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Too many temporary teachers; too few civil service teachers.	Undersupply of civil service teachers, maldistribution of teachers among schools, many small schools where the required pupil-teacher ratio (P/T) of 20-1 cannot be realized.	The issue is caused by such things as teachers wanting to be close to home and the fact that the DEO cannot hire as many civil service teachers as they need.

SSA	SSB	SSD
There was a lot of conversation, but the respondents did not give a conclusive answer to the question. ²⁹	Too many underqualified teachers, too few civil service teachers, and a maldistribution of civil service teachers among schools.	Many small schools, many teachers who cannot teach 24 lessons, maldistribution of teachers in schools (in particular, <i>Sekolah Menengah Pertama</i> [SMP; junior secondary school/education]), not enough qualified teachers, and too many temporary teachers.

On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being small and 5 being very big, how **big** would you say the teacher deployment issue is here?

CJA	CJB	CJC
4-5	2	4

SSA	SSB	SSD
Respondents described how the process of teacher transfer works, but never answered the question.	1-2	3

²⁹ What respondents did say was that before the Teacher Deployment Program (TDP), they were transferring teachers, but when pressed on the issue, it became clear that all the transfers had been at the request of the teachers.

On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being easy and 5 being very difficult, how **difficult** would you say the teacher deployment issue is here?

CJA	CJB	CJC
4-5	2	4

SSA	SSB	SSD
There was a lot of conversation, but the respondents did not give a conclusive answer to the question.	1-2	3-4

Why?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Several regulations in place that are difficult to resolve—addressing the issue while trying to maximize teachers who can teach the 24 lessons per week and have class sizes of 20-to-1.	All of the work is within the scope of the district's every day work; little political interference.	In some instances there is a lot of bureaucracy to deal with. Also, when multi-grade schools are created, the MOEC's personnel systems do not allow for teachers to teach in more than one grade/class.

SSA	SSB	SSD
Since respondents did not answer the previous question, this question was not asked.	Respondents have a very small district, no more than 10 km in diameter, so teachers can be moved around without too much political resistance.	Not applicable (NA) However, while respondents did not think that the teacher deployment issue was a terribly difficult one, they did face some difficulties in that teachers do not want to be transferred and the District Assembly (DA) and District Head (DH) are against the plan

In percentage terms, how many primary teachers in your district/school are unable to teach in the minimum size class of 20-to-1?

CJB	CJC
14%	35%

SSA	SSB	SSD
62%	6%	10%

In percentage terms, how many junior secondary teachers in your district/school are unable to teach the minimum required 24 lessons per week?

CJB	CJC
0%	0%, but this may not be the case with the new curriculum next year

SSA	SSB	SSD
48%	7%	10%

In your district, does the 50% rule (the regulation that states that a district cannot spend more than 50% of its budget on personnel) prevent you from hiring more civil service teachers?

CJB	CJC
This is a very big issue. The district needs many more civil service teachers, but can only hire ~20/year; more than 100 will retire this year.	This is a very big problem. Respondents referred to this as the “moratorium” on hiring civil servants.

SSA	SSB	SSD
The district already spends more than 50%; ³⁰ respondents noted that temporary teachers can be hired using <i>Bantuan Operasional Sekolah</i> (BOS government allocated School Operational Assistance Funds) money. ³¹	The district can only hire temporary teachers.	No, civil servants’ salaries have not yet reached 50% of the total district budget

Which of the five policy options offered by USAID PRIORITAS are the two hardest to implement (from both an administrative and political perspective)?

CJB	CJC
Mergers (only one policy option was offered)	Multi-grade; mergers

SSA	SSB	SSD
Mergers; transfers	Mergers; recruiting	Transferring teachers; recruitment

Which of these are the two easiest to implement?

CJB	CJC
Reclassifying temporary teachers into civil service teachers (only one policy option offered)	Mobile teachers (reassignment); transfers

SSA	SSB	SSD
Recruitment; mobile teachers (reassignment)	Transfers; mobile teachers (reassignment)	Mobile teachers (reassignment); multi-grade schools

³⁰ USAID PRIORITAS may want to look into this claim. Can more than 50% of the district’s budget actually be spent on civil service salaries? What happens when this occurs?

³¹ The study team learned that starting this year, BOS money can no longer be used to hire temporary teachers and that the districts have to now pay for these teachers. However, temporary teacher salaries are outside of the salaries that cannot exceed 50% of the district budget. Where will the districts get the money to pay for these temporary teachers?

Which ones did you choose to do? Why?

CJB	CJC
Transfers, mobile teachers, multi-grade schools, and reclassifying some primary school (SD) and SMP teachers; all were done because teachers would benefit from it (e.g., get the required 24 lessons or 20–1 class size). All this work was done with the “personal approach,” as described in Section 3.4.	Merging schools and mobile teachers afforded many teachers the opportunity to teach the required 24 lessons per week (and to be in 20/1 classrooms), a more realistic set of options.

SSA	SSB	SSD
Recruitment; easy to do	Transfers and mobile; easiest to do	Transfers because of the large imbalance issue; mobile because it is easy to do; and recruitment because it is easy. ³²

Why did you not choose to do the others?

CJB	CJC
Mergers: the others were easier	Because the other options presented themselves as the ones to do

SSA	SSB	SSD
Difficult to do (and really not terribly interested in doing anything about the teacher deployment issue since the respondents know that the District Head [DH] is against it).	There are so few small schools that mergers and multi-grade schools are really not open to the DEO as viable options. Also, they saw recruitment as difficult to do, likely due to the salary limit.	Mergers, because they will meet resistance from the parents ³³ and multi-grade, because the MOEC has not yet established a training program for multi-grade teachers.

What did the district have in the way of a TDP plan—something that instructed the district to take action?

CJB	CJC
The district had a “plan” which was really a set of official directives, or signed regulations, indicating the schools in which multi-grade teaching would take place, the names of the teachers to be transferred and the schools impacted by the transfers, and the names of the teachers who would serve as mobile teachers and the impacted schools. They also reclassified a number of teachers for which no regulation was shown.	The district had a plan that consisted of two official policy directives, or signed regulations, one for the schools that would be merged and the other for the multi-grade schools. The transferred principals were largely a result of the mergers (they had to move 1–2 principals depending on the number of schools they merged). The study team did not see a plan for the mobile teachers, but were told that one existed—mobile teachers may be authorized under an existing, more overarching regulation, so maybe this is why they did not produce the regulation

³² Note that respondents still listed recruitment as one of the two most difficult policy options to implement.

³³ Transfers would also more than likely meet resistance, but respondents still chose this option.

SSA	SSB	SSD
<p>Respondents were unable to provide signed regulation for teachers who had requested transfers. The study team was told that there was a TDP-related regulation in place that was signed by the DH after he got re-elected. The study team obtained a copy of this regulation and was advised by a USAID PRIORITAS staff member in South Sulawesi that the regulation was “normative,” that it did not indicate that any particular TDP-type actions should take place, which explains why it was never implemented.</p>	<p>Respondents claimed to have already transferred “less than 10” teachers, while another 97 were being processed. They also claimed to have created a number of mobile teachers (such that they could acquire the 24 lessons per week), but were unable to provide the exact number. Respondents noted that no regulations were needed for the transfers, only a letter from the DH. As for the mobile teachers, they said that existing regulations were in place to allow for teachers to become mobile teachers, so no new regulations needed to be made. The study team saw no plan and no regulations dictating the exact teachers to be transferred as the study team had in Central Java.</p>	<p>Respondents developed a plan, yet the District Assembly was against it and the DH will not sign it. Teachers are becoming mobile teachers under existing central regulations, but in spite that the District Education Office (DEO) has detailed data on what schools can be involved and which teachers could be mobile teachers at those schools, the DEO is not being proactive. Rather, teachers are left to work it all out on their own. The study team spoke to teachers, who said that they would very much like support from the district instead of having to go out and find a school that may need them. Teachers expressed a lack of confidence in the district when it comes to management.</p>

Was there widespread ownership of the plan/effort?

CJB	CJC
Yes	Yes

SSA	SSB	SSD
<p>No, the respondents seemed to have never been on board with TDP since they know that the DH will not address the issue for fear that he will lose the teachers during the next election.</p>	<p>It is difficult to say if the DEO ever had a plan. Respondents said that all teachers agreed to the measures that were being taken and that there should have been some level of ownership of the action taken.</p>	<p>The district went through the entire TDP process, so in this regard there is a degree of ownership. Also, the DEO sees the teacher deployment issue as a major problem, but there is no high-level support for it and nothing has been signed.</p>

In your opinion do you believe that it was a difficult plan to implement? Why?

CJB	CJC
No	Yes and no, there were easy aspects and difficult aspects. It was easy to merge the schools, but it was difficult to deal with the extra principal after the schools were merged.

SSA	SSB	SSD
<p>NA: there was no real plan, so it was never implemented.</p>	<p>No, both since teacher transfers and mobile teachers were considered the two easiest policy options to implement. Also, because SSB is so small, addressing the teacher deployment issue is fairly simple in that most teachers do not resist being transferred.</p>	<p>The DEO is letting the teachers sort out the mobile teacher issue on their own, and the rest is not being implemented due to a lack of high-level support.</p>

Is this work that you ordinarily do, is it all routine work for you?

CJB	CJC
All of the TDP-related work is routine; the DEO has done these things in the past, so they all know how to do it.	All of the TDP-related work is routine, they have done these things in the past, so they all know how to do it.

SSA	SSB	SSD
The work involved in all five policy options is routine work.	This is all routine work.	Yes, it is all routine work.

How did you achieve your accomplishments, to what do you attribute your success?

CJB	
Accomplishment	Discussion
107 SD/SMP transfers	The USAID PRIORITAS mapping exercise helped the district see which schools had an undersupply and which schools had an oversupply of teachers. Most important was the consultative manner in which the work was done. Through what the district referred to as their “personal approach,” which is premised on three values, (1) reason, (2) empathy, and (3) two-way communication, respondents claim to have met very little resistance from those teachers who were being transferred. Given the tactics used in other districts, it is quite likely that many of the transfers allowed the teachers to teach 24 lessons per week, gave teachers certification if they taught in the rural area for a pre-determined amount of time, or that the distance of the new school was not that far from where the teacher lived. The biggest obstacle the district faces is married female teachers. They cannot move them too far from where their husband works. Therefore, they mostly do not move them, even though there are a large number of teachers who need to be moved. The district did not encounter any political resistance.
3 multi-grade schools	Teachers volunteered because the Government of Indonesia (GOI) offered an incentive (increased salary). There was no political resistance here. CJB sees multi-grade schools as a temporary arrangement until a sufficient number of teachers can be hired. But, multi-grade schools are not as much a remedy for too few teachers, as they are a remedy for too few students. The major challenge is training the teachers to teach in a multi-grade classroom. There was no apparent mention as to whether or not the teachers actually received this training. In another district they observed that there is no official multi-grade teacher training program. USAID PRIORITAS staff noted that there was, initially, some resistance that was quelled with USAID PRIORITAS support. This resistance was met prior to plan finalization. The resistance involved some officials believing that it would lessen the quality of education offered.
28 reclassified SD teachers and 5 reclassified SMP teachers	This was routine work and respondents claimed that there was no resistance from those impacted.
19 mobile teachers	All 19 teachers wanted to become mobile teachers because it allowed them to teach the required 24 lessons per week.

CJC	
Accomplishment	Discussion
22 merged schools	Some schools did not have a principal. Therefore, merging a school without a principal with one with a principal was a good option. There was considerable support from the DH and the DEH (who was a very qualified leader and worked to complete tasks). Respondents also mentioned that there were incentives in place. For example, some teachers would be able to have 20-1 class sizes, and extra technical equipment and teacher training was promised. The difficulty in merging schools is the blending of multiple school cultures. This was overcome through communication between the two staffs. Another problem with multiple principals involved choosing the ones that had to be transferred. In general, there are many transferred principals in CJC, largely because of all the merged schools. The end result was a high degree of demand for the merging, due to teachers benefiting from their ability to have larger classes. Politics did not factor into the decision.

CJC	
Accomplishment	Discussion
	<p><i>School A</i> (in which the study team had the chance to talk with teachers and the principal): Two schools became one. The schools were only 80 meters apart, and most of the teachers were teaching classes smaller than 20 –1. After the merger, one school teaches grades 1–3 and the other teaches grades 4–6. All teachers now have classes greater than 20-1. Only one teacher had to be transferred and one principal. There was widespread demand for this to happen. Additionally, the DH was behind improved teacher deployment and the official procedures for merging schools were made available to the two schools so that they knew what they had to do from a bureaucratic standpoint.</p> <p><i>School B</i>: Three schools became one, but they were three schools on the same campus and in very close proximity. It became obvious to school leaders that it was best to have one principal rather than three. Essentially, this school merger changed nothing in terms of class sizes—it was purely an administrative. All three of these schools are “favorite” schools,³⁴ so small class sizes were not an issue.</p>
21 multi-grade schools	This was done because the DEO felt that the learning outcomes in proximal grades (1 and 2; 3 and 4) are similar enough that it is best to have multi-grade schools when merging was not possible. The district prepared more than 100 schools to become multi-grade schools, but an administrative issue prevented them from transitioning more than 21 schools to multi-grade schools. One issue is that central personnel data systems do not accommodate classroom teachers who teach in more than one grade. The District Education Head is still working with the MOEC on this matter.
82 transferred principals	Many of these transferred principals were the outcome of the successful school mergers. The only issue was deciding which principals would be transferred. Through discussions with the principals, the decision was made and the transfers were made without resistance.
250 SD mobile teachers	The key here was coordination with other schools, asking if they were in need of teachers, and finding out how many teachers would benefit from being able to teach the 24 lessons per week.
General	Overall, the District Education Head (DEH) helped all of the above changes to happen because she lobbied both the DH and the District Assembly by using data to highlight the size and nature of the issue and bringing attention to inefficiencies.

SSB	
Accomplishment	Discussion
6–7 teachers transferred; 97 being processed	The success of this effort can be attributed to the fact that SSB is a very small district that is no more than 10 km in diameter. As a result, a transferred teacher does not get transferred very far from where they their original location. The district tried to convince teachers that going to a new school would help to solve a district-wide issue and that they would become “refreshed” by going to a new school. The DEO claimed that all teachers agreed to be transferred. The respondents also noted that many teachers requested to be transferred. There were no major challenges; however, because they are still in the process of transferring teachers, their level of success cannot yet be determined.
NA ³⁵ mobile teachers	Here the success can be attributed to the fact that both schools impacted by the mobile teachers needed the teachers, and the teachers were able to teach the required 24 lessons per week. No obstacles were met and the teachers welcomed becoming mobile teachers.

³⁴ “Favorite” is an informal designation, but the schools are well known as such. The term refers to schools that are favored by the district and community; where most senior government staff send their children; and that tend to get extra resourcing and develop a reputation for quality, based on various informal criteria, including high results on exams.

³⁵ The DEO tried to obtain the number, but they did not have it available.

SSC	
Accomplishment	Discussion
All accomplishments	The entire district completely supports improved equitable quality education—it is enshrined in their 5-Year Strategic Plan. All teacher deployment initiatives have been done by first obtaining the affected parties' approval. Teachers want to be transferred so that they can teach the 24 lessons or to receive the remote school stipend.

What are the high priority issues facing this district?

CJB	CJC
The inability to transfer married female teachers	Corporal punishment to students; teachers who are not interested in teaching anymore (retirement is close at hand and they are biding their time). ³⁶

SSA	SSB	SSD
None, there are no other urgent issues	Teacher competency	The lack of regulations that will allow the TDP plan to be implemented (which is another way of saying that the plan has not been approved).

Where does the teacher deployment issue stand relative to these other issues?

CJB	CJC
It is related, but the teacher deployment issue is seen as more urgent.	The teacher deployment issue is much more urgent.

SSA	SSB	SSD
The teacher deployment issue is the most urgent issue.	The teacher deployment issue is not as urgent as the teacher competency issue, but this did not deter the district from addressing their teacher deployment issue	They are much the same issue.

To what extent to political/patronage networks impact the TDP work that you are doing?

CJB	CJC
Although respondents acknowledged the existence of these networks, they claimed that there was a sharp distinction between the technical work that people do and politics. Politics do not interfere with the education work of the district. The DH received a national anti-corruption award last year, so it would appear that there is leadership in this regard at the top.	Politics is politics and schooling is schooling; the two do not mix.

³⁶ 70 teachers are going to retire this year, but the district can only hire 50. When asked why, respondents simply said that this was the number that had been approved.

SSA	SSB	SSD
The patronage networks here are a big problem, so big that the TDP effort failed.	Respondents claim that although the patronage networks are in place, they did not factor into their efforts to transfer teachers and create mobile teachers. Teachers were not (at least among the first 10), upset by their transfer.	The situation here is much the same as it is in SSA: the DH will not sign off on regulations that will allow the TDP plan to be implemented because the teachers are very active in local elections and the DH (and District Assembly) are keen on having teacher support in the next election.

Was the DH supportive of all of this work?

CJB	CJC
Yes, very	Yes, very

SSA	SSB	SSD
No. The DH will not move on the teacher deployment issue for fear of upsetting the teachers and not having them on his side for the next election. This being the case, the DEO cannot do anything.	He signed off on the teachers who had already been transferred and there was no opposition to the mobile teachers	No

Service providers and USAID PRIORITAS staff – Central Java

Discussions with three service providers who supported TDP and CPD in non-target districts and watched both programs develop were asked questions about the TDP and CPD. A total of four districts were discussed. Some among those districts discussed had no CPD plans in place, while one had a CPD plan in place that was not yet signed by the DH and little indication that it would be signed. One district reported no accomplishments under TDP. In all these cases, the attributing factor was the lack of high-level support for the work. In one district, the teachers refused to contribute 3–5% of their professional allowance and they lobbied the District Assembly to get the CPD plan blocked. In another district, the teachers union has blocked the CPD effort because the teachers do not want to pay the 3–5% from their professional allowance. During these discussions, CJB was discussed because, at some point, there was reportedly some resistance to the CPD plan, but USAID PRIORITAS lobbied the DH, who then pressed the DEO to move ahead with it.

In districts where CPD plans have been developed and signed, the teachers have been convinced that the best CPD is a *CPD in which the teachers have made a personal investment*; the teachers have come to agree on this.

The biggest contribution that USAID PRIORITAS has made is the data analysis for TDP. This has allowed the districts to know information, such as exactly what schools can be merged and which teachers can be transferred.

When asked about cultural differences between Central Java and South Sulawesi, the service providers (SPs) and USAID PRIORITAS staff noted that family ties were much stronger in South Sulawesi and that district staff in Central Java have a high level of respect for authority.

Service providers, USAID PRIORITAS staff, and Provincial Education Officers – South Sulawesi

When asked why 6 out of 10 USAID PRIORITAS districts in Central Java had succeeded in generating TDP accomplishments while only 1 out of 7 districts in South Sulawesi had, the response noted the reason as being because of the existence of the patronage networks in South Sulawesi. In general, there are many more ethnic groups in South Sulawesi and political parties are aligned along the ethnic groups. Family/tribal ties and kinship networks in the South Sulawesi Province are much bigger, stronger, and reach deeper into the political system than in Central Java. Many people get their jobs because of family, ethnic group, kinship, or party affiliation and the support that they provided in the last election (or potential support they may provide in the next election). When a District Head chooses not to sign off on a regulation, not much can be done except, maybe, to rid the plan of any contentious elements. Anything that might upset the teachers is largely eschewed.

Multi-grade schools are usually not attempted because there are, as per a number of respondents, no central guidelines in place on how to implement these types of schools, no training programs in place for the teachers, and inability of the MOEC personnel data systems to accommodate multi-grade teachers. Mergers can be done, but because at least one principal, and perhaps some teachers, would have to be transferred in the process, in addition to the possibility of upsetting parents they are not generally done. Everyone agreed that the work of the five policy options is routine work. This may not necessarily mean that the DEO knows how to do it—as noted, DEO staff are not always hired for their technical background—but the regulations and protocols for these policy options are all in place, except those for multi-grade schools.

Respondents said that mobile teachers are an attractive option, but *teachers make the arrangements themselves*. In SSD, both the teachers and the DEO commented that the mobile teacher process is teacher initiated and driven. Importantly, this process did not have to be left to teachers, as the data that USAID PRIORITAS provided in the TDP showed exactly where mobile teachers could be mobilized—the districts did have the information needed to support the process.

It was also observed that when a DH wins the election, they can and often do, especially if they are from a new political party, remove everyone in the district; the entire DEO can be removed, as can all the teachers. Many DHs will then hire family members and/or people who helped them get elected. Overall, the entire organizational culture is quite different from Central Java. DHs do not want to upset teachers or school staff because they help the DH get re-elected.

The Provincial Education Office (PEO) is trying to determine how to manage this issue. It blames the issues on decentralization at the district level. In South Sulawesi, “teachers are politicians first and teachers second.”

In addition, in this province, most urban schools have an oversupply of qualified teachers, while most rural schools have an undersupply of qualified teachers. Further, many urban schools are staffed with family members, so they are intransigent—school staff cannot be moved unless a new party comes into power.

The DEO/DEH are often times fearful knowing that as easily as they may have gotten their job, they could lose it if they do something that “rocks the boat”. For example, a situation in South Sulawesi that may develop, generally speaking, is one where the DH will not sign off on anything that might upset the teachers out of fear of losing the teachers’ support in the next election. This creates a patronage system that provides jobs to people based on family and kinship and reluctance within the DEO to do anything that might upset the teachers and/or the DH for fear of losing their jobs.

There was an account told by the respondents of two districts where the SPs knew of teachers being transferred. However, in one district, the DH and DEH were very pro-education, but they had to entice the teachers to be transferred by saying that if the teachers agreed to the transfer they would get certified. In the other district, the transfers had nothing to do with the teacher deployment issue, but were all political in nature.

With regard to the 2011 Joint Five Ministerial Edict³⁷ for teacher deployment, respondents observed that the districts do not give it much credence, in large part because they have seen that when it is not adhered to, the MOEC does not impose sanctions.

Regarding the CPD plan, teachers see the need for CPD, but they have little interest in giving the DEO any of its teacher professional allowance (TPP) and would rather use it themselves to address their needs as they see fit.

As for cultural differences, everything is highly political in South Sulawesi, as opposed to Central Java, because of the culture of kinship and ethnic groups. The political parties are all aligned along ethnic lines. Interestingly, respondents also observed that education is more valued in Central Java.

When asked about the organizational culture of the DEOs in South Sulawesi, respondents said that with regard to the TDP, people are very unhappy, unenthusiastic, and very much against it.

General personal impressions and additional information

CJA

Although the organizational motivation that was felt in CJB and CJC was not as apparent in CJA, the CJA district was still achieving change and had the high-level support to do so. They also knew how to lobby the District Assembly and to use data for that process. In general, this district has the motivation and initiative needed to continue addressing teacher deployment issues.

CJB

This district appeared to be a very capable place, where the work that they did on TDP was perceived to be more or less routine. The district has a “can do” attitude to the point where they did not think that the TDP effort was very difficult. There seemed to be motivation and an ineffable organizational force that drove them to do the work. Their plans were readily available. Also, the district maintained that the DH was entirely in favor of this

³⁷ The 2011 edict was issued by the Ministers of Finance, Home Affairs, Education, Civil Service and Bureaucratic Reform, and Religion.

effort, so there was leadership at the top. Additionally, the USAID PRIORITAS staff's observation was that in Central Java, government staff respect authority and do what they are told to do. When the DEO staff were asked if there were any cultural differences between Central Java and South Sulawesi, they said that people in Central Java were easy going, while the people in South Sulawesi tended to be more assertive, meaning that; they tell you what is on their mind.

CJC

CJC nearly mimics the findings in CJB, yet they seem to be even more committed to completing TDP work. In Central Java, people follow what a superior tells them to do and seem to take pleasure in their work. This resonates with the “personal approach” that was mentioned in CJB.

SSA

This district reflects very much the opposite of what was found in Central Java. Here, no results were reported, mainly because no plan was ever implemented. The district got to the point where, after the policy implementation workshops (PIW), it had the details of a plan, but when it came to converting those details into a meaningful set of regulations, it never happened. In SSA, the patronage networks and politics dominate the teacher deployment landscape. People are hired for what they did in a past election and/or for what they can do in a future election. The teacher deployment issue threatens to upset teachers, who are considered crucial in an election. Therefore, the DH will not address the teacher deployment issue in any meaningful way. The study team noticed that respondents seemed to avoid answering questions and showed a general unwillingness to discuss the teacher deployment issue. However, when the topic turned to CPD, respondents were more than engaging. When asked about the TPP and how the teachers would respond to it, they said that they would have many consultative meetings and get them to agree to it and that they were drafting a regulation that would require the teachers to contribute 15% of the professional allowance. However, this 15% contribution in a district that does not want to upset teachers, makes one wonder if the respondents are naïve or if they want the regulation not to be signed (note in SSC, their CPD plan does not include any money from the TPP, so as to not upset teachers). Comparatively, in Central Java, where the environment is quite different, CJB and CJC have legislation in place that only asks for 3–4% of the teachers' professional allowance.

SSB

SSB is the smallest district among all that were visited and discussed. It also had the smallest teacher deployment issue. These factors account for why, in a place like South Sulawesi, where the patronage networks are so strong, they were able to begin to address their teacher deployment issue. The district also noted that the ethnic groups further south from them are very different from the ethnic groups that populate SSB, with the former being more “aggressive,” “less inclined to do what they are told to do,” and “having to be pushed very hard to get things done,” while the ethnic groups that populate SSB are more inclined to follow directions from someone in authority. Although they are not like the officials the study team met in Central Java, they were also not like the officials the study team met in

SSA. SSB seems to be very carefully chipping away at their teacher deployment issue in a manner that keeps as much peace as possible.

The study team had a chance to talk with some teachers about both the teacher deployment issue and CPD. With regard to teacher deployment, the study team asked them what role they played for the DH when it came to elections. Their response was that as private citizens, not as teachers, they encourage their families to vote for the DH. When asked if they might all get replaced if the person they were trying to get elected would lose the election, they noted that while it could happen, it does not happen much in SSB. In fact, they related how in one instance, a new DH gave DEOs, who he knew had supported the losing candidate, new and better jobs in an effort to try to win them over so that they would support him in the next election. Teachers were also asked what they would do if they were being transferred against their will. Their response was that they would go to their District Assembly representative and get them to intervene in some way (i.e., convince the DH not to sign the transfer). When asked why the TDP in Central Java has accomplished greater success than in South Sulawesi, they mentioned the tight family connections and kinship networks in South Sulawesi. They have family relationships throughout the system and family is very close. Further, the teachers cited that in Central Java, teachers are always looking for ways to advance, which is not so prevalent in SSB, where they are quite comfortable in their current school and would rather not move. One teacher noted that a transfer would be difficult because they would have to adapt to a new school, and they would not want to face new challenges when they know that their competencies are low. The teachers noted that their school was overstaffed, and when asked why, they said that it is usually due to a District Assembly representative getting the school to hire someone as a temporary teacher (for political purposes). Yet, as comfortable as the teachers proclaimed to be with where they are, if a transfer meant that they could teach 24 lessons, they would all agree to it.

The discussion with the teachers also focused on CPD, how they felt about the manner in which their needs are assessed, and their willingness to help pay for it with a percentage of their professional allowance. They believe that the national competency exam is a poor way to assess teachers and, therefore, any CPD program premised on the results of the exam are not really addressing their needs. Teachers would much rather that objective classroom observation be the basis of a needs assessment and that CPD courses be developed and offered based on this. They also mentioned that their needs are in part assessed on the teacher performance approach carried out by the principal.

SSC

Because SSC is not a USAID PRIORITAS district, it did not participate in the TDP. Nevertheless, the study team asked respondents from the district a number of questions about teacher deployment. They saw it as an issue and one that they are doing something about. The district has transferred a number of teachers, created a number of mobile teachers, recruited civil service teachers from the ranks of temporary teachers, and made effective use of temporary teachers. In every instance, not one teacher has been asked to do anything that they did not want to do. All mobile teachers gladly became mobile teachers because they could teach the minimum 24 lessons per week, all transferred teachers agreed

to being transferred, because they would be able to teach the 24 lessons, and many temporary teachers were incentivized to go to rural schools where teachers were needed because the district offered them money if they did (e.g., Rp250,000 per month last year and Rp500,000 per month this year)—this could only happen in rural schools that are formally designated as remote by the MOEC.

SSC appears to be performing as well, if not better, than any USAID PRIORITAS district and doing so entirely on its own, apart from the following, as told by a USAID PRIORITAS staff member, “SSC has never participated or [done] Workshop TDP, whether conducted by USAID PRIORITAS or independently. But last year, when the study team assisted them with the CPD program, the Education Office asked about TDP and I explained the concept to them. They were attracted by the explanation and the Education Office programmed for TDP to be done independently.”

Clearly, there is a considerable amount of leadership in SSC. The DEH is outstanding and has a goal of high-quality education for all” in mind. Her staff seemed to be equally committed. When asked where their drive comes from, they noted that not only do they care, but the entire district cares. The SSC 5-Year Strategic Plan has economic growth as its cornerstone and has enshrined equitable quality education as one of the key means of driving this economic growth. Thus, there is a very high level of political will behind all of this work—so long as nothing is done to upset the teachers. The district purports that no teacher has been or ever will be moved against their will. It has a very adroit approach to the teacher deployment issue: do all that you can with great ardor, without upsetting the teachers. When asked what role the teachers play in local elections, respondents were quick to answer “none,” made a few general comments, and moved on to another topic. Considering what the study team had been told/know about South Sulawesi, it is highly unlikely that the teachers are not involved in politics. It is also quite unlikely that SSC is the only district in South Sulawesi where patronage networks do not exist. If they did not exist and teachers played no role in the elections, why would they be so careful not to upset them?

When asked why 6 out of 10 USAID PRIORITAS districts in Central Java performed well in the TDP compared to only 1 out of 7 in South Sulawesi, respondents said that the level of infrastructural development in Central Java is much better. Therefore, a rural school in Central Java is not anywhere near as isolated as a rural school in South Sulawesi. They also said that education is simply valued more in Central Java. Finally, the whole notion of kinship was again mentioned by respondents. They reported that people teach near their village, they have close ties to their family, and they do not want to move far from their home.

Respondents also mentioned the “socialization” work that they do. They have done much advocacy around the goals of the strategic plan, the role that equitable quality education must play, and the need to solve the teacher deployment issue.

The district’s desire to not upset the teachers in any way is underscored by the fact that their CPD plan excludes any funds from the TPP. Their commitment to the CPD plan is emphasized with how much more the government is contributing compared to the other districts. The district is also doing a great amount of socialization work around getting teachers to use their TPP for their own CPD, apart from the CPD plan.

Finally, when respondents were asked what would happen if policies began to upset teachers, their response was that they would never transfer a teacher against his or her will.

SSD

The situation in SSD was similar to the one in SSA, in that the District Assembly and the DH were against the TDP plan because they did not want to upset the teachers who are very active in local elections and whose support is needed in future elections. The study team spoke with teachers in the district who observed that there was a large teacher deployment issue in SSD and that many teachers in their school were not only unable to teach the 24 lessons, but had to go out on their own to find additional schools to work in to teach the 24 lessons (to become mobile teachers). Having to do this, the teachers said that they are not focused on their teaching as much as they should be. During the interviews, teachers also voiced that they did not understand why the district was unable to help. By and large, they did not hold the DEO in high esteem when it came to management. Further, the study team was unclear why the district included teacher transfers in their TDP plan when it knew it would cause problems? Unlike SSA, where the DEO appeared to be disinterested in the teacher deployment issue in general, the respondents in SSD were interested, but appeared to have their hands tied. As for CPD, they believe that they can get 5% from the TPP. The DEO is doing a lot of advocacy among the teachers around CPD and the need for teachers to contribute 5%; the district hopes these efforts will be successful.

The study team also visited an SMP school and talked with its teachers. The teachers noted that there was no overarching TDP plan in place and that they had 12 classrooms and 37 teachers, meaning that very few could teach the 24 lessons required. Most teachers in the urban areas do not want to go to the rural areas, which has led to political tension. This is compounded by the tight connections (i.e., family) that some teachers have within the government. Before decentralization, the DH could do as they pleased because they were a central agent, now the DH must be mindful of getting re-elected. SSD has no official “remote area” like SSC, so the remote area incentive cannot be used in this district. However, even when teachers were asked if they were offered Rp500,000 per month, would they go to a remote school, they all said “no.” The teachers in this district play a large role in the elections. Therefore, the DH is keen not to upset them to keep their support in the next election.

With regard to CPD, teacher needs are assessed based on the national competency exam, and teachers are okay with this method. They do not believe that the teacher appraisal is something that can be used by the district, only the school. When asked why they believed this, they responded that they do not recognize the DEO as capable of using the data in a way that would lead to a viable needs-based CPD program. The teacher training programs that teachers have received in the past (apart from USAID PRIORITAS) have not addressed their needs. This could be why they like the competency exam as a basis for assessing needs: they do not have much confidence in the technical capabilities of the DEO. The interviewed teachers interviewed stated that they would be willing to pay 10% of their TPP if they knew that the DEO could offer meaningful CPD programs, but they do not have confidence that this can happen.

When asked why Central Java performed better than South Sulawesi in the TDP, respondents noted the close family ties that extend into government and the associated politics. Further, when comparing themselves with SSB, the teachers noted that there are many outsiders that go to SSB, so the family ties are not as strong there as in SSD.

On average, before USAID PRIORITAS, one teacher per year received around three days of training. When asked if this frequency met their needs, the teachers were hesitant to answer.

It is noteworthy to mention that the CPD program started in January 2016, so they had not had a prior CPD plan in place.

Annex B: Continuing Professional Development

In this annex, “raw data” from questions asked about the CPD program is presented. The questions in the structured interview are shown with each district’s answer below the question.

USAID PRIORITAS dissemination

In the past, have you trained teachers using Decentralized Basic Education (DBE) or US Agency for International Development (USAID) PRIORITAS training modules and used some of your own money to help pay for this training? If yes, how many teachers were trained on these modules?

CJA	CJB	CJC
No DBE or USAID PRIORITAS training done outside of DBE/USAID PRIORITAS—no independent dissemination	No	Yes: 238

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Yes	Yes, ~500	No ³⁸	Yes, but no numbers

How much of your own money did you spend?

CJA	CJB	CJC
None	None	Rp47,600,000

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Rp1,900,000	Rp500,000,000	None	Yes, but no numbers

CPD program

Your CPD plan contains a list of CPD programs that will be offered to the teachers. On what basis were these courses selected?³⁹

CJA	CJB	CJC
Teacher self-assessment and teacher performance appraisal conducted by principal and/or supervisor	Results of the national teacher competency exam and feedback from the teacher performance appraisal conducted by the principal and/or supervisor.	Assessment of the data showing how many teachers were still in need of USAID PRIORITAS training and teacher self-assessment data.

³⁸ SSC was a DBE Project district. When asked this question, respondents mentioned several USAID-developed modules, but when asked how much of this training they paid for out-of-pocket, they did not provide a response. However, respondents did note how much money they had set aside for the CPD program.

³⁹ Central Java USAID PRIORITAS staff said that multi-district meetings are conducted to which universities and Teacher Training Institutes (TTIs) are invited. At the meetings, the universities and TTIs present their courses and the districts choose the course(s) they want. The teachers who attend the meetings are chosen by the principal and, at times, by a supervisor.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
The results on the teacher competency exam.	The results of the competency exam; no mention of the teacher performance appraisal.	Teachers' performance on the national competency exam.	Teachers' performance on the national competency exam, teacher performance appraisal, and the department of public employment also assesses teacher needs and trains teachers based on whether or not they have been trained in a course they are offering—there is supply-driven training.

How did you identify the particular teachers who would be trained?⁴⁰

CJA	CJB	CJC
Central regulation dictates that every teacher must be trained once per year; in the past this has been impossible due to a lack of funds, with teacher money (i.e., teacher professional allowance [TPP]) and school money (i.e., government allocated school operational assistance funds [BOS]) now in place, training is doable. The number of teachers targeted includes all the primary teachers (need did not play a large role). Respondents did not explain why the junior secondary (JS) teachers were not in the count. Respondents also said that new teachers factor into the projected number.	Identified were all those teachers who scored below 5.5 on the national teacher competency exam, with input from the teacher appraisal data and awareness of the funds the DEO had available for CPD. Teachers, who need to be trained but did not meet the requirements or were not selected, will be trained next year.	All teachers are to be trained, so there were no criteria used to identify a subset of teachers.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
All teachers are planned because respondents believed that all teachers needed training, albeit different training for different teachers.	Identified were 75% of all teachers. The number reflects what the DEO feels they can afford, noting that while all teachers need CPD, the targeted percentage of teachers are the highest priority.	All teachers are to be trained, so there were no criteria used to identify a subset of teachers.	All teachers are to be trained, so there were no criteria used to identify a subset of teachers.

How many total teachers are there?⁴¹

CJA	CJB	CJC
3,358 primary; 740 JS	3,593 SD (USAID PRIORITAS data) 1,055 SMP (USAID PRIORITAS data) 2,900 SD (verbal confirmation from CJB); 225 SMP from the field	4948 SD 1720 SMP

⁴⁰ The intent behind this question was to see on what basis a subset of teachers was chosen for training and if this was the case, the criteria used to choose that subset of teacher. If all teachers are targeted for training, then no such criteria were used.

⁴¹ See **Table 7** for the final numbers.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Not applicable (NA) because all teachers are being trained	789 SD ⁴² 484 SMP	All will be trained.	All will be trained 4,374 SD 828 SMP

Are you pleased with the support that USAID PRIORITAS has provided in the development of the CPD plan? Is there anything more that you would like to have seen done?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Pleased with the quality of USAID PRIORITAS' support.	Pleased with the quality of USAID PRIORITAS' support.	Respondents were quite pleased and will always accept more USAID PRIORITAS funds and support.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Respondents were very pleased with USAID PRIORITAS' support.	NA	Pleased with all support that USAID PRIORITAS has offered and would like to see more.	Yes, but district was only at the data analysis stage.

USAID PRIORITAS defined “teacher training needs” as those teachers who have not yet received training on various USAID PRIORITAS teacher training modules. Were you in agreement with this? Did you see it as USAID PRIORITAS pushing its own agenda?

CJA	CJB	CJC
No negative feelings about this. Respondents welcome whatever USAID PRIORITAS can provide.	Respondents were happy to teach the USAID PRIORITAS modules.	Respondents very much liked the USAID PRIORITAS modules.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Respondents were very pleased with the USAID PRIORITAS modules.	By and large pleased but would like more support with data analysis.	Respondents very much liked the USAID PRIORITAS modules. They mentioned the Innovative Teaching and Learning module in particular.	This has not yet been done.

Was the plan developed in collaboration with the TTIs?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Yes, the TTIs will be major service providers; an MOU was drafted in this regard.	The TTI staff members serve as resource persons, or expert trainers, so there was some interaction with the TTIs. Further, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed with one TTI.	The TTIs were involved in that they are the ones who teach some of the courses.

⁴²When comparing the ratio of SD teachers to SMP teachers, SSB overwhelmingly has the smallest ratio. This can be attributed to them having so few schools and that only 6% of teachers teach in classes smaller than the 20–1 ratio.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
No	Respondents have an MOU in place with UNM (Universitas Negeri Makassar). UNM shared their courses and the District Education Office (DEO) selected the ones that would be in the plan.	Yes, in that they will act as service providers so they had to know what the needs were and offer courses that would meet those needs.	The respondents have MOUs in place with universities and the provincial quality assurance department.

Was this plan integrated into the annual district planning cycle? In the 5-year Strategic Plan?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Yes: CPD has been included in the 5-year strategic plan, which means that it is in the annual plan. Respondents recently got a new DH. Therefore, a new 5-year strategic plan will be developed and CPD will be included.	Yes: CPD has been included in the 5-year strategic plan, which means that it is in the annual plan. Respondents recently got a new DH. Therefore, a new 5-year strategic plan will be developed and CPD will be included.	Yes: CPD has been included in the 5-year strategic plan, which means that it is in the annual plan. Respondents recently got a new DH. Therefore, a new 5-year strategic plan will be developed and CPD will be included.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Yes: CPD has been included in the 5-year strategic plan, which means that it is in the annual plan. Respondents recently got a new DH. Therefore, a new 5-year strategic plan will be developed and CPD will be included.	Yes: CPD has been included in the 5-year strategic plan, which means that it is in the annual plan. Respondents recently got a new DH. Therefore, a new 5-year strategic plan will be developed and CPD will be included.	Yes: CPD has been included in the 5-year strategic plan, which means that it is in the annual plan. Respondents recently got a new DH. Therefore, a new 5-year strategic plan will be developed and CPD will be included.	Yes: CPD has been included in the 5-year strategic plan, which means that it is in the annual plan. Respondents recently got a new DH. Therefore, a new 5-year strategic plan will be developed and CPD will be included.

Do you think you will get all the BOS money?

CJA	CJB	CJC
NA	NA	Yes

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Yes	Not sure	Yes	NA: Respondents had not yet budgeted the amount they cannot ascertain if they can expect to get it all.

Do you think you will get the TPP money?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Respondents believed that teachers also have a responsibility for their own CPD and that they should pay the 4–5% of their allowance. There is a regulation in place now that should help to ensure that it gets paid.	NA	Yes

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Respondents will have consultations with the teachers and try to convince them that they should contribute 15% of their professional allowance.	Not sure, some said yes, some said no. Asking for 10%, but not doing much consultation.	Their CPD plan excludes this source of funding.	Respondents believe they can get 5%, but when asked about a signed regulation, they were not quite as sure; doing lots of advocacy.

Do you think you will get the government money?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Yes, because it is in the plan. Also, respondents learned that the amount of money that they have budgeted from the government is almost twice that which CJB has budgeted, yet both districts have around the same number of teachers. When asked how this happened, respondents said that the DEO staff lobbied the DH and the legislature, using data describing the teacher deployment issue to make their case.	Yes. Respondents observed that the amount of money they have received from the district for CPD in the past has been small, citing that infrastructure has been a district priority. They are now hoping that they can begin to get more money. Note: Higher priorities will impact the amount of money that education will get, but this raises many questions about minimum spending standards across sectors, whether capital funds can be used for recurrent expenditures and whether recurrent funds can be used for capital expenditures. USAID PRIORITAS may have to look into how finance works.	Yes

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Yes	Yes	Yes and more if need be	NA: Respondents have not budgeted the amount and they cannot respond

Did you enact any legislation to support this financing (e.g., the percentage of funding from teachers)?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Yes	Yes	A draft is in place

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
None	None, plan is still in development ⁴³	Existing regulations suffice	None is in place

⁴³SSB respondents noted that a central regulation exists that states that 10% of the teacher professional allowance must be spent on CPD. The study team has talked with many people during program implementation and this is the first time that the team heard about this regulation. A USAID PRIORITAS staff member from the study team said it was the first time he had heard about it, too. However, the DEO said that with the central regulation in place, there is no need for the district to enforce a teacher professional allowance.

How will the training be delivered here—who will be involved and what role will they play?

CJA	CJB	CJC
University and TTI staff and quality assurance staff will all act as experts. They will train a cadre of master trainers who will then train teachers in the schools or clusters.	TTI staff will all act as experts. They will train a cadre of master trainers who will then train teachers in the schools or clusters.	Training of trainers (TOT) using TTI resource persons and a cadre of master trainers and trainers.

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
TOT through the Provincial QA office, who will use their staff as resources persons or expert trainers.	TOT	TOT using QA staff, TTIs, and universities.	TOT using service providers.

Is any regular mentoring included in your CPD plans?

CJA	CJB	CJC
No, all mentoring done by USAID PRIORITAS	No	No

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
Yes	Yes, along with a budget	Yes, along with a budget	Plan not yet in place

Established a MOU and/or serious working relationship with a TTI?

CJA	CJB	CJC
Yes	Yes	Yes

SSA	SSB	SSC	SSD
No	Yes (UNM)	Yes	Yes

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